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Introduction 
 
 
The events of the recent financial crisis gave reasons to be more and more concerned about 
sovereign and banks credit risks. In fact, the situation of several countries and banking sectors 
worsened significantly in the last few years.  
Several States had to deal with severe distress in their financial markets and had to carry out 
significant bailouts to rescue their local banks. Therefore, during the crisis, banks and 
sovereign credit risks suffered significant increases.  
Moreover, these two risks showed to be linked together in such a way that a worsening in 
sovereign credit risk was mirrored by an equivalent worsening in banks credit risk. The 
sovereigns, in fact, by carrying out the bailouts, took over the risk of the rescued banks. 
Through this risk shifting the credit risk of sovereign started to be linked to those of banks.  
Thus, many authors, focusing on the link between sovereign and banks credit risks, identify 
the bailouts as the trigger factor of this link. Acharya et al. (2014), in particular, identify three 
important phases in the link: an initial phase before the bailouts where the two risks are not 
linked; a period just after the bailouts in which the link starts and the sovereign takes over 
banks risk; a period after the bailouts in which the two risks co-move and a vicious cycle 
starts between sovereign and banks credit risks.  
Breaking the vicious link between sovereign and banks credit risks provided the impetus for 
the creation of the Banking Union. This goal should be achieved through the establishment of 
a common supervision supported by a common resolution and a common deposits insurance 
throughout Europe. 
We analyze data on sovereign and banks CDS to show that the link between sovereign and 
banks credit risks is present also between Italian sovereign and Italian banks credit risks. We 
show that in the case of Italy the bailout is not the trigger factor of the link. Moreover, we 
show that the Banking Union has positive effects on the link, by weakening it, in the long run.  
In order to present our analysis, the work is structured as follows: the first chapter introduces 
the concept of credit risk, in particular it focuses on sovereign and banks credit risks. The 
second chapter focuses on the link between sovereign credit risk and banks credit risk. The 
third chapter focuses on the Banking Union. The fourth Chapter presents the model on which 
the empirical analysis is built on. The fifth chapter presents the empirical analysis and its 
results. 
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Chapter 1 
The credit risk 
 
Banks and States faced several difficulties during the crisis. These difficulties were mirrored 
by a sharp increase in the credit risk of both European banks and sovereigns since 2008.  
The crisis started as a banking crisis, with several failures of banks. These lead to important 
losses in trust among banks and investors. Thus, banks faced a higher risk of being unable to 
meet their credit obligations. The banking crisis soon developed in a sovereign debt crisis. 
This was due, among other factors, to the several rescue packages that the sovereign enacted 
to reach stability in the financial sector. While this assistance to banks reduced the problems 
of the financial sector, it increased public debt and government liabilities, raising concerns 
about the fiscal sustainability of some countries.    
Since credit risk has become an important issue of this period, the aim of this chapter is to 
give an overview on this risk. We first give a general definition and then focus on bank and 
sovereign credit risks.  
 
1.1 Definition of credit risk1 
Credit risk, also known as default risk, is the risk that companies or individuals will be unable 
to make the required payments on their debt obligations. Thus, it is the risk that one who 
borrows  money is unable to pay them back. Credit risk is determined by the probability of 
default of the borrower. The higher is the probability that the individual, or company, is 
unable to pay back the money (the event default), the higher is the credit risk.   
In the case of bonds, credit risk is the risk that the bond issuer will not be able to make the 
required coupon and principal payments. The interest rates of bonds are a signal of the level 
of credit risk. The higher the interest rate the higher the credit risk of the issuer. 
Moreover, credit risk affects credit ratings. There are several credit agencies like Moody's and 
Standard & Poor's which research and analyze bond offerings in an effort to measure the 
issuer's  risk. The results of their work are credit ratings that investors can track and compare 
with other issuers. Usually the lower  the rating  the higher the  probability  of  default  of   the 
issuer and so the higher the credit risk
2
.   
                                                          
1
 Part of the contents presented in this paragraph are taken from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVe3TM 
UDSDw. 
2
 For example Standard & Poor's ratings vary from AAA (the most secure) to D, which means the issuer is 
already in default. Moody's ratings go from Aaa to C. Only bonds rated BBB or better are considered 
"investment grade." Anything below BBB- or Baa3 is considered "junk." Usually treasury bonds have the 
highest ratings. 
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Many factors can influence an issuer's credit risk and in varying degrees. These factors 
influence the level of credit risk by affecting the probability of default. 
Among all, we can identify: 
 Financial strength of the bond issuer. The stronger is the financial position of the 
issuer the lower is the credit risk. The financial strength of the issuer is determined 
first by the ratio between assets and liabilities and, secondly, by the capital structure of 
the issuing company. 
 Ability to generate cash flows in the future. The future cash flows are important to 
cover the future principal and interest payments to the lender. Therefore the higher the 
ability to create future cash flow the lower the credit risk, since the probability of 
default remains low.  
 Possibility of increased expenses. If the costs increase faster than the revenues the 
probability of default increases, raising the credit risk of the issuer. 
 The credit risk associated with foreign bonds also includes the home country's 
sociopolitical situation and the stability and regulatory activity of its government. 
 
1.1.1 Credit Default Swaps (CDS): A measure of credit risk 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are contracts where a buyer makes a payment to a seller in return 
for a promise that the seller will compensate the buyer if a specified credit event occurs (Kriz 
et al. 2015). The international Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA) gives the definition 
of three types of credit event: 
 Failure to pay principal or coupon when they are due: hence, already the failure to pay 
a coupon might represent a credit event, albeit most likely one with a high recovery 
(i.e. ‘technical default’). 
 Restructuring: The range of admissible events depends on the currency and the precise 
terms which materialize. 
 Repudiation / moratorium (Fontana et al. 2010). 
In essence, a CDS is a credit derivative contract between two parties. The buyer, often 
referred to as the “protection buyer,” makes periodic (usually quarterly) payments (called the 
premium or “spread”) to the seller (or “protection seller”) and receives in return the promise 
of a payoff if an underlying financial instrument defaults or experiences a similar credit event 
(Kriz et al. 2015). It can be seen as an insurance against the risk of default of the underlying 
financial instrument. The structure of a CDS is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Rights and obligations under a CDS contract 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration built on Kriz et al. (2015). 
The “spread” of a CDS is the amount (the premium) that the protection buyer must pay to the 
protection seller over the length of the CDS contract, usually quoted as a percentage of the 
notional amount. For instance, if the CDS spread of an AAA municipal government is 30 
basis points, or 0.3%, then an investor buying $1 million worth of AAA municipal bonds 
must pay the seller $3,000 per year. These payments are usually made on a quarterly basis and 
continue until either the CDS contract expires or a credit event occurs. A CDS associated with 
a higher spread is considered more likely to default by the market, since a higher fee is 
charged to protect against such an event (Kriz et al. 2015). Thus, when default risk increases 
and therefore also credit risk increases, CDS spreads increase. Therefore market participants 
consider CDS spreads indicators of the likelihood of default or the riskiness of the underlying 
debt asset. For these reasons CDS are considered as a measure of credit risk.  
 
1.2 Bank credit risk 
Bank credit risk is the risk that a bank fails. A bank failure occurs when a bank is unable to 
meet its obligations to its depositors or other creditors because it has become insolvent or too 
illiquid to meet its liabilities. In this sense, bank credit risk incorporates both liquidity and 
insolvency risks of a bank. Both risks are strictly connected with the issue of maturity 
transformation, one of the primary functions of the financial system. In most cases, banks 
finance their investments in loans or bonds by issuing liabilities whose average maturity is 
shorter than that of those same investments. The fundamental role of banks in facilitating the 
maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks vulnerable 
to liquidity risk. This consists in the risk that demands for repayment outstrip the capacity to 
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raise new liabilities or liquefy assets
3
. Thus, a liquidity crisis occurs when a bank is unable to 
cover the demand for repayment of its depositor by using its funds or by selling asset without 
losing too much on their sell prices. If a liquidity crisis is not well managed a bank runs into 
an insolvency crisis. The market value of its assets declines to a value that is less than the 
market value of its liabilities. Thus, the bank is no longer able to cover its liabilities, to meet 
its obligation an goes into insolvency. At this point, to avoid  bankruptcy, the bank is bailed 
out by the sovereign, or, as the new European Union regulation envisages, the costs of 
insolvency are borne by its shareholders, subordinated bondholders and the bondholders up to 
8% of assets (the new bail in tool). 
The failure of a bank is generally considered more relevant than the failure of other types of 
business firms because of the interconnectedness and fragility of banking institutions. It is 
often feared that the effects of the failure of one bank can quickly spread throughout the 
economy and possibly cause the failure of other banks. These contagion effects can result in a 
systemic failure of banks that creates several problems to the real economy as can be seen 
from the recent global financial crisis.  
During the recent crisis banks faced several problems in term of liquidity and solvency which 
lead to a sharp increase in their credit risk.  
The crisis started in the US with the subprime meltdown. The American financial institution 
in the pre-crisis period made a lot of loans thanks the new securitization technics
4
. The major 
part of such new securities were strictly connected to the real estate (this is the case of the 
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities, RMBS). For this reason when the real estate bubble 
burst, a lot of people were unable to repay their debts. Many banks, consequently, suffered a 
lot of losses due to the missed payments of the loans and experienced an increase in their 
credit risk. The credibility of banks started to weaken because of the growing concerns about 
the decreasing creditworthiness of their counterparts. Banks that were strictly connected, no 
longer trusted in each other. As a result, the interbank market virtually closed and risk 
premiums on interbank loans soared. Banks faced a serious liquidity problem, as they 
experienced major difficulties to rollover their short-term debt (European Commission, 2009). 
With the rise of interbank loans rates it has become more difficult for banks to raise funds for 
its activities. Many banks started to be unable to meet their obligations with depositors an 
                                                          
3
 Notes taken from the material of the course “Banking: Financial and Risk Management” , University of  Padua,  
A.Y. 2014 - 2015. 
4
 Securitization: the bank pools together all its loans and sells it to another entity, the special purpose vehicle 
(SPV). In exchange the bank gets money to make new loans. The SPV, to get the money to pay the bank, issues 
new instrument with the pool of loans given by the bank. These new securities are the product of the 
securitization process, usually called Asset Backed Securities(ABS). The SPV divides the pool of loans in 
different trances accordingly to the probability of repayment. The result is a set of new securities with different 
ratings. 
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other creditors, entering in this way in a liquidity crisis. This additionally raises the credit risk 
of banks.  
Hence, during the crisis banks faced a lot of difficulties that were translated in higher levels of 
credit risk. To face all these difficulties banks were forced to restrain credit, increase the rates 
on their lending activities, reduce liabilities and so on. Furthermore, also the intervention of 
the European Central Bank was needed. The ECB introduced several unconventional policy 
measures, in order to help banks to restore their position.  
As a result of the increasing credit risk, also banks CDS spreads rose significantly during the 
crisis. Effectively, investor asked for higher risk premiums worried about the troubles that 
banks were facing. 
     Figure 2: Banks CDS spreads (2007/2011) 
 
The figure shows the CDS spreads of the major banks of US, Europe and Australia from 2007 to 2011. 
The CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. High CDS spreads mirror high credit risk. 
Source: http://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2011/09/the-rbnz-throws-cold-water-on-the-rba/bank-cds-
spreads/. 
Figure 2 gives an overview on the CDS spreads of the major banks in US, Europe and 
Australia during the crisis. As can be seen, the CDS spreads follow the same pattern in all the 
three areas showing the global diffusion of the crisis. The spreads level started to increase in 
the middle of 2007 when the liquidity cost started to rise and the interbank market showed the 
first signs of collapse. Higher cost of liquidity increased the liquidity risk of banks which was 
translated into higher credit risk mirrored in higher level of CDS spreads. Furthermore, it can 
be seen that the spread level remained high for the entire period of the crisis. This high levels 
were translated into high levels of credit risk. 
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1.3 Sovereign credit risk 
Sovereign credit risk is the risk of a government becoming unwilling or unable to meet its 
loan obligations. Hence, the credit risk of a sovereign is strictly connected with the level of 
public debt. The higher the level of debt the more are the concerns about the ability of the 
sovereign to pay back its debt. The higher is the probability that the sovereign is unable to 
repay its debt the higher is the sovereign credit risk. 
Many are the causes of the rise of sovereign credit risk. Among all, the more relevant are: 
 Weak actual and potential growth. Collapsing economic activity sharply reduces tax 
revenues. Moreover, a rising unemployment, consequence of a weak economic 
growth, leads to increasingly large state benefit payments. To support the economy 
most governments  also offer stimulus packages and reduce taxes (Sgherri e al. 2009). 
All these facts increase the level of debt and, thus, the sovereign credit risk rises. 
 Competitive weakness. This can be a result of a low economic growth. Moreover, it 
is the strongest signal of the scarcer performance of some countries to export its 
product abroad. 
 Liquidation of banks and sovereigns. In case of financial distress, most governments 
intervene in order to restore financial markets stability. Sovereigns usually commit 
large resources to guarantee, recapitalize, and resolve financial institutions, as well as 
support certain asset markets (Sgherri et al. 2009). The same happens if there is a 
country that needs to be bailed out. All these actions impact on public debt, raising 
therefore sovereign credit risk. 
 Large pre-existing debt-to-GDP ratios.  High levels of debt-to-GDP ratio imply a 
high number of obligations that has to be met. In addition, if a crisis starts and the 
GDP growth begins to decline, the government has to intervene with a number of aids 
to the economy. This has a negative impact on the already high debt making it difficult 
for the government to repay its debt. Thus, the credit risk of the sovereign rises. 
 Considerable liability stocks. The more are the liabilities of a sovereign the higher is 
the number of obligations to be met. Moreover, the higher is the number of obligations 
to be met the greater is the difficulty to meet these. Therefore the credit risk rises. 
During the recent financial crisis many countries suffered a sovereign debt crisis in addition to 
the banking crisis. Thus, they faced an increasing sovereign credit risk. Greece, Cyprus, 
Ireland are examples of countries that faced very high sovereign credit risk. 
Different are the reason that lead to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Some countries, like 
Greece, had unsustainable high levels of public debt. Other countries, like Ireland and Spain, 
13 
 
had to bail out financial institutions. Moreover, other countries like Italy, in addition to high 
levels of public debt, lost political credibility. The development of the sovereign credit risk of 
European countries can be seen by looking at the levels of sovereign CDS spreads. These are 
shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3: Sovereign CDS spreads (2007/2016) 
 
The figure shows sovereign CDS spreads from 2007 to 2016. The CDS spread values are expressed in 
basis points. High levels of spread mean high sovereign credit risk for the considered country. Greece is 
dropped for reason of unit of measure. Greece has very high levels of CDS spreads and this does not 
permit to understand the trend of the other countries CDS spreads.  
Source: Datastream. Authors own evaluation. 
As can be seen in figure 3, the increase of CDS spreads started at the end of 2008 when many 
countries had to bail out their local banks.  
The country facing the highest increase in sovereign credit risk at the end of 2008 was 
Iceland. This country in fact, had to rescue from failure three of its major banks in late 2008.  
Other countries that showed a peak in sovereign credit risk in late 2008 were Ireland (which 
also bailed out national banks at the end of September 2008) and Czech Republic. They faced 
an increase in risk at the beginning of the period and then recovered slowly. 
The other European countries followed an almost opposite pattern. They started with relative 
low values and then showed an important rise in sovereign credit risk in the period between 
2010 and 2011.  
14 
 
Cyprus, Portugal, Spain and Italy show the highest level of sovereign credit risk. Among all 
the reason for such an increase there was the risk of default of Greece (which is dropped in 
the figure for reasons of unit of measure). 
To conclude, the bad economic condition, due to the crisis, made the public debt growing 
because of the reduction of taxes revenues and the large expenditure for stimulus packages. 
Moreover, the difficult situation of many banks made essential the intervention of the State. 
Thus, the stabilization of the financial markets with several bailouts increased the public debt 
which was already high, putting the European countries in a weaker position. This caused the 
huge increase of the sovereign credit risk in the euro area. 
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Chapter 2 
The link between bank and sovereign credit risks 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, banks and sovereigns credit risks became important 
features of the recent global financial crisis. Moreover, these two risks showed to be bound 
and this was one of the causes that further aggravated the financial crisis. In the majority of 
cases, this link started to be evident after the bailouts of financial institutions enacted by the 
governments. Thus, the several bailouts, occurred during the crisis, can be considered as the 
trigger factor that generates the link between banks and sovereign credit risks. 
Accordingly to Acharya et al. (2014), three phases can be identified in the relationship 
between credit risk of banks and credit risk of sovereigns: a pre-bailout phase in which there 
is no link between the two risks; a bailout phase, in which the two credit risks start to be 
linked; finally, a post-bailout phase, characterized by a feedback loop, in which the two risks 
move together.  
The chapter presents the three phases of the relationship between banks credit risk and 
sovereign credit risk. Furthermore, it focuses on the reasons that lead to it and those which 
exacerbate it. 
 
2.1     The first phase: the pre-bailout phase 
The first phase covers the pre-crisis period. It is characterized by the absence of a relationship 
between banks and sovereign credit risks. The two risks move independently showing 
different patterns of behavior. 
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2008, there was essentially no sign of sovereign credit 
risk in the majority of developed economies, and the prevailing view was unlikely to be a 
concern for these economies in the near future (Acharya et al. 2014). Thus, this first period 
was characterized by a significant increase in the credit risk of the financial sectors while 
almost no change in sovereign credit risk. 
Evidence of this first phase can be obtained from the changes in banks and sovereigns CDS 
spreads during this period.  
Figure 4
5
 shows the changes  in banks  and sovereign CDS spreads for the Eurozone countries 
                                                          
5
 Figure 4 is taken from Acharya et al. (2014). The authors consider as pre-bailout phase the interval from 
01/01/2007 to 25/09/2008 since they take as starting point of their case study Ireland. The Irish government 
announced the bailout of six of the Irish major banks on 30 September 2008. For these reasons they established 
these limits for the first phase. Although, after Ireland other countries bailed out their major banks. Thus, the pre-
bailout phase can be consider significant also for all the other European countries. 
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in the pre-bailout phase. As can be seen, banks CDS spreads show a very different behavior 
with respect to sovereigns CDS spreads. In fact, the pre-bailout period is characterized by a 
significant increase in banks CDS spreads while almost no change in sovereign CDS spreads 
for the majority of the European countries. This confirms the absence of a link between banks 
credit risk and sovereigns credit risk during the pre-bailout phase.  
Figure 4: Changes in banks and sovereigns CDS spreads in the pre-bailout phase 
 
The figure shows the changes in sovereigns and average banks CDS spreads of the Eurozone countries in 
the pre-bailout phase. The pre-bailout phase goes from 01/01/2007 to 25/09/2008. The banks CDS 
spreads are computed as the equal-weighted average of banks CDS spreads for banks headquartered in 
that country. CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. Source: Acharya et al. (2014). 
The country that shows the greatest difference in the changes in CDS spread is Ireland. The 
CDS spreads of Irish banks show a huge increase in this first phase while almost no change in 
the sovereign spreads. Thus, again this example shows that in the pre-bailout phase, for the 
majority of the European countries, the credit risks of banks and sovereign are not linked. 
 
2.2     The second phase: the bailout phase 
The second phase focuses on the event of bailout of a financial institution by the government 
and its effects on the economy. After the bailouts, in fact, sovereign credit risk and banks 
credit risk start to be linked.  
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In  the case of  a financial distress the  sovereign  intervenes  in  order  to restore  financial  
stability.  
It has to bailout the distressed financial institution in order to prevent it from bankruptcy
6
. The 
sovereign can finance the bailout through taxation or through the issuance of new public debt. 
In the case that the bailout is large and the economy is already hit by a financial crisis, the 
sovereign cannot increase the burden of taxation so it has to issue new debt. This in turn 
increases its credit risk since the amount of debt that has to be repaid is sharply increased. 
Consistently with this, the second phase is mainly characterized by a huge increase in the 
credit risk of sovereigns and a corresponding decrease in  the credit risk of banks. This is due 
to the fact that the bailouts alleviate the financial sector distress. However, they increase the 
level of public debt and consequently the credit risk of sovereigns.  
Moreover, by rescuing a bank the sovereign takes off its risk. Hence, the increase in sovereign 
credit risk and the immediate reduction in bank credit risk represents a risk shifting from 
banks to the sovereign. With the risk shifting banks and sovereign credit risks start to be liked 
together.  
Since the risk shifting is due to the bailouts, these can be considered as the trigger factor that 
generates the relationship between bank and sovereign credit risks. 
Evidence of this can be found in the events of the recent financial crisis. The bailouts 
consisted of asset purchase programs, debt guarantees, equity injections, or some combination 
thereof (Acharya et al., 2014). The costs of these programs were substantial, at an estimated 
54% of GDP in the United Kingdom, 28% of GDP in Germany, 9% and 12% of GDP in 
Spain and Portugal, respectively, roughly 30% of GDP in Austria and the Netherlands and 
22% of GDP in the United States
7
. In order to cover these huge costs, sovereigns were forced 
to issue new debt and consequently to sacrifice their creditworthiness. As a consequence, the 
credit risk of sovereigns raised significantly. On the other hand, the credit risk of banks 
decreased substantially since bailouts were beneficial to the financial markets.  
Additional demonstration of what said can be found by looking at the CDS spreads of banks 
and sovereigns in this period.  
Figure 5
8
 shows the changes in the CDS spreads of banks and sovereigns for the Eurozone 
countries during the bailout phase. As can be seen, banks CDS spreads decrease significantly 
                                                          
6
 As stated by Veronesi et al. (2010), the government intervenes in case of market failure. In particular, the 
government intervenes in case of  bank runs or excessive leverage that leads to inefficient underinvestment (debt 
overhang problem (Myers, 1977)). 
7
 Data taken from König et al. (2014). 
8
 Figure 5 is taken from Acharya et al. (2014). The authors consider as bailout phase the period from 22/10/2008 
to 30/06/2008. This period covers the bailouts started with the Irish one and ending with the bailout set up by the 
Swedish government.  
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in this period. The important rescue packages of the governments, in fact, reduce banks credit 
risk. Consistently with what said before, sovereigns CDS spreads rise significantly.  
Moreover, also the risk shifting between banks and sovereigns can be identified: a positive 
change in sovereigns CDS spreads is mirrored by a negative change in banks CDS spreads.  
The country with the greatest changes in CDS spreads is Ireland. This is consistent with what 
said since the Irish government bailed out six of its major national banks at the end of 
September 2008. Other countries that show important changes in CDS spreads are Belgium, 
Spain and Portugal. Different is the case of Italy. In fact, banks and sovereign CDS changes 
move in the same direction. This can be due to the fact that Italy did not carry out bailouts in 
this period. 
Thus, the link between sovereign and banks credit risks starts to be evident after the bailouts 
for the majority of the European countries. Therefore, as many studies recognize, the bailout 
of a financial institution by the sovereign is the major trigger factor of the link between banks 
credit risk and sovereign credit risk. 
Figure 5: Changes in banks and sovereigns CDS spreads in the bailout phase 
 
The figure shows the changes in average banks and sovereigns CDS spreads for the Eurozone countries in 
the bailout phase. The bailout phase goes from 26/09/2008 to 21/10/2008. The banks CDS spreads are 
computed as the equal-weighted average of banks CDS spreads for banks headquartered in that country. 
CDS spreads are expressed in basis points.  
Source: Acharya et al. (2014). 
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Another collateral effect of the bailouts is the increase in the sensitivity of sovereign credit 
risk to the crisis events.  
As stated by Ejsing et al. (2011) in fact, the risk transfer from the financial sector to the 
government has also a dynamic dimension. Actually, sovereigns and banks credit risks 
depend on the events of the crisis. The financial sector and the public sector are increasingly 
distressed by the aggravation of the macroeconomic situation, that consists for example in 
reduced profit expectations or decreasing tax revenues and increasing fiscal deficit. Moreover, 
an additional driving force affecting credit risk is investors' risk aversion. Since investors' risk 
aversion is likely to be countercyclical, it increases both banks and sovereign credit risks with 
the worsening of the macroeconomic situation. The magnitude at which the events of the 
crisis affect the two credit risks depends on their sensitivity to these crucial events. Ejsing et 
al. (2011) demonstrates that after the bailouts banks sensitivity to further aggravations of the 
crisis is reduced whereas sovereign sensitivity increases significantly. The data in Ejsing et al. 
(2011) show that with the introduction of rescue packages, the sovereigns sensitivity nearly 
quintupled and stayed around this level until mid-March 2009 (Ejsing et al. 2011). The 
increase in the sensitivity of sovereign credit risk to aggravations of the crisis makes the 
sovereign more vulnerable and, hence, more likely to default. This strongly affects the link 
between banks and sovereign credit risks and the risk transfer between the two entities. 
 
2.2.1    The case of indirect bailouts 
Bailouts can be also indirect that is with no direct capital injection. In this case, bailouts take 
the form of bank debt guarantees by the government.  
König et al (2014) confirms the risk transfer from banks to the sovereign also in case of an 
indirect bailout. In fact, by introducing a guarantee scheme, the government provides 
incentives for bank creditors to continue financing the bank and thereby reduces the 
likelihood of a bank run. By reducing the risk of a bank run the sovereign reduces the 
probability of default of the bank and in turn it reduces its credit risk. Nevertheless, in the case 
that the bank is run despite the guarantee, the government has to face additional financial 
distress. Anticipating this situation, sovereign creditors become more reluctant to roll over 
their claims. This affects negatively the ability of the government to repay its debt causing a 
sharp increase in the credit risk of the sovereign. Thus, also in the case of an indirect bailout 
we observe a risk shifting from banks to the sovereign.  
In order to be successful, the guarantee schemes have to be credible. First, the guarantee has 
to be not too large. Second, also the balance sheet transparency plays an important role in the 
efficiency of the guarantee scheme since it affects the guarantee costs. For a guarantee scheme 
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to be successful the costs must be not too high. If the bank balance sheet transparency is low, 
the promise of guarantee increases the sovereign expected liabilities. Therefore, sovereign 
creditors become more reluctant to roll over their claims. Consequently, the sovereign credit 
risk raises since its probability of default is increased. This, in turn, weakens the effect of the 
guarantee and also bank creditors become less willing to prolong their funding (König et al. 
2014).  
 
2.2.2    Moral hazard and banks bailouts 
Accordingly to Acharya et al. (2014), Mariathasan et al. (2014) and Dam et al. (2012), future 
financial sector incentives are distorted by the implementation of bailouts, because of moral 
hazard. Thus, moral hazard is one of the main problems of the bailout. 
The expectation of a bailout by the government induces banks to engage in inefficient and 
high risk investments and to assume excessive financing risks, since they know that in the 
worst case they are rescued by the government. Hence, the likelihood of the enactment of a 
bailout, and so the risk shifting from banks to sovereign and all the problems that it carries, 
increases with moral hazard. 
Mariathasan et al. (2014) demonstrates that banks tend to be more leveraged, more weakly 
capitalized and more exposed to severe liquidity mismatch when they or their competitors are 
likely to benefit from a public support. In this way, expectations of public rescue packages 
become a significant determinant of financial instability.  
Going more in depth, the perception of a bailout leads to excessive investments in risky 
assets. The excessive undertaking of risky investments however can be reduced with a higher 
supervision of banks activity and with a higher government efficiency. Moreover, in order to 
reduce the detrimental effect on leverage and capital quality, a useful mechanism is to restrict 
the range of the permissible activities set up by banks.  
In addition, Mariathasan et al. (2014) found that bailout expectations have a systemic effect. 
Moral hazard, in fact, increases with the increased likelihood of a public support to the bank 
competitors. Indeed, a greater expectation of support to competitors provides incentives for 
banks to engage in more risk-taking strategies. 
To conclude, banks moral hazard is fostered by the expectation of a public intervention to 
restore financial stability. Thus, the perspective of a bank bailout has a significant role in the 
risk faced by banks. However, the higher risk taken by the bank increases the likelihood of the 
bank to be bailout by the government. This, in turn, increases the credit risk of the sovereign. 
Hence moral hazard, despite affecting banks risk taking, has significant indirect effects on 
sovereign credit risk.  
21 
 
2.3     The third phase: the post-bailout phase 
The third phase covers a longer period after the bailouts. We showed before that the bailouts 
restore financial stability. However, after this initial reduction, banks credit risk increases 
again and reaches the level of sovereign credit risk. Thus, the post-bailout phase is 
characterized by a positive co-movement of banks credit risk and sovereign credit risk.  
In particular, aggravations in sovereign credit risk affect significantly banks credit risk. 
Evidence of this behavior can be found looking at the changes in banks and sovereign CDS 
spreads during the recent financial crisis. These are shown in figure 6
9
. 
Figure 6: Changes in banks and sovereigns CDS spreads in the post-bailout phase 
 
The figure shows the changes in sovereigns and average banks CDS spreads in the post-bailout phase for 
the Eurozone countries. The post-bailout phase goes from 22/10/2008 to 30/06/2010. The banks CDS 
spreads are computed as the equal-weighted average of banks CDS for banks headquartered in that 
country. CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. Source: Acharya et al. (2014). 
As can be seen in figure 6, both sovereigns and banks CDS spreads re-widened as the crisis 
aggravated further. Moreover, both sovereigns and banks CDS spreads in most countries 
present similar magnitudes of changes. Thus, accordingly to what was said above, banks and 
sovereign CDS spreads strongly co-move after banks bailouts.  
                                                          
9
 Figure 6 is taken from Acharya et al. (2014). The authors consider as the post-bailout phase the period just after 
the bailouts, from 22 October 2008 to 30 June 2010. This period covers the important further aggravations of the 
crisis. 
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The country with the greatest changes in CDS spreads is Greece. Greece sovereign crisis 
spilled over to the country banking system, creating a twin crisis. 
Moreover, the negative effects of an aggravation in sovereign credit risk on banks credit risk 
triggers a feedback loop between the two risks. Many studies refer to this feedback loop as to 
the “diabolic loop” for the magnitude of its effects. 
Figure 7 gives a representation of the sovereign-banks credit risks “diabolic loop”. 
Figure 7: The diabolic loop 
 
Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2015). 
As can be seen in figure 7, a distress in the financial sector, which affects the liquidity and the 
solvency of banks, increases the probability of a bailout, and, in turn, the costs of the bailout. 
Once the bailout is done the debt burden increases and, consequently, the sovereign credit risk 
(increased debt risk in the figure). A higher sovereign credit risk feeds back to banks credit 
risk through several channels, in particular through the depreciation of the banks sovereign 
debt holdings. This strongly affects banks solvency and consequently increases again the 
probability of a bailout. A new bailout increases the sovereign credit risk and the cycle starts 
again.  
Moreover, a distressed bank reduces loans to the economy. This reduces economic growth 
and tax revenues. A reduced economic growth and lower tax revenues affect negatively the 
ability of the government to repay its debt and, as a consequence, the risk of a sovereign 
default increases. Thus, the sovereign credit risk increases again and this impacts on banks 
credit risk by increasing it. The cycle starts again. 
As shown in figure 7, the main channel through which the increase of sovereign credit risk 
deteriorates banks credit risk, is the devaluation of sovereign debt holdings of banks.  
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However, going more in depth, there are four main channels through which sovereign credit 
risk affects banks credit risk: 
 First of all, as said before, increases in sovereign credit risk cause losses on banks 
government bond holdings, thereby weakening their balance sheets. Banks often have 
large holdings of sovereign debt. Thus, an increase in sovereign credit risk is 
particularly damaging for it. Moreover, this effect is exacerbated by the strong home 
bias in the sovereign portfolios of banks, as will be seen below. 
Banks then own also debt issued by foreign sovereigns in their portfolios. Also the 
increase in credit risk of foreign sovereigns affects banks credit risk. 
 The deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness causes falls in the market price of 
sovereign bonds. This reduces the values of the assets that banks can use as collateral 
to secure wholesale funding. 
Moreover, rating downgrades can exclude government bonds from eligible collaterals 
or increase the haircuts applied by the counterparties. As a consequence of 
government downgrade, also banks can suffer a rating downgrade which possibly 
reduces their market access. 
 The deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness, and the subsequently increase in 
sovereign credit risk, weakens the credibility of implicit bailout guarantees provided 
by the government. 
 Also the collateral framework of the ECB plays a significant role. The increasing 
enactment by the government of guarantees for banks in the same country tightens the 
link between banks and sovereign credit risks. The broadening of the eligible assets 
class to be used as collateral for the transaction with the ECB has increased the 
number of indirect bailouts
10
. So collateral frameworks increases the likelihood of the 
presence of the link between sovereign and banks credit risks. 
The intensity of each of these channels is likely to depend on the characteristics of the banks  
(such as the level of capitalization, the reliance on funding sources, the quality of the loan 
portfolio) as well as on business models and lending strategies.  
Thus, once the bailout is carried out a link between banks credit risk and sovereign credit risk 
is created. Moreover, in the period after the bailout sovereign credit risk strongly affects 
banks credit risk. Therefore, a worsening in sovereign stability conditions affects badly banks 
stability, and this leads to a feedback loop between banks and sovereign. The channels 
                                                          
10
 Government guarantees increased greatly in advance of the second three-year Long Term Refinancing 
Operations in February 2012, especially in Italy. The run up to this LTRO also saw the inclusion of more than 
10000 securities trading on non-regulated markets into the set of eligible collateral (Nyborg 2015). 
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through which the loop works are several and different are the conditions that strengthen the 
link and, consequently, exacerbate the effects of the loop. 
 
2.3.1 Home country bias 
Home country bias in sovereign debt holdings occurs when banks hold a significant high 
amount of domestic sovereign debt with respect to foreign ones. 
Home country bias characterized the majority of the European banks during the recent 
financial crisis. Indeed, the expanding sovereign debt was increasingly absorbed by the local 
(i.e. belonging to the same country) banking sector. Data from the crisis show that at the end 
of 2013 the amount of sovereign debt held by the domestic banking sectors of the Eurozone 
countries was more than twice than that held in 2007. On average, between 2010 and 2013, 
sovereign debt holdings of domestic banks (as opposed to foreign banks) increased by 5% of 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Becker et al. 2014). This huge increase in domestic public 
debt holdings was one of the major causes of the worsening of the link between banks and 
sovereign credit risks during the crisis. 
As stated before, the holdings of sovereign debt of banks represent the major channel through 
which changes in sovereign credit risk are translated into changes in banks credit risk. Hence, 
this transmission is amplified in the case of home country bias. Banks with a strong home bias 
in their sovereign debt holdings are more severely affected by sovereign distress. 
As stated by Altavilla et al. (2015), in principle sovereign stress may be transmitted to banks 
even if they hold no domestic sovereign debt, since it weakens the credibility of the implicit 
bailout guarantee provided by the government. It may also impact directly on the solvency of 
domestic firms, and hence on their creditor banks. Thus, sovereign stress may also be 
transmitted to banks via a “direct channel”, quite apart from their exposure to government 
debt. But this baseline effect will be amplified for banks that are heavily exposed (Altavilla et 
al. 2015).  
Moreover, many studies focusing on the effect of home country bias on bank stability show a 
controversial effect: the holdings of domestic sovereign debt increase more in the banks 
belonging to the countries with the highest sovereign risk. This is a contradiction since banks 
that are already exposed to a high risk due to their sovereign higher credit risk should not 
invest in high risky debt. This is the case of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (the 
GIIPS), which showed an average increase in banks domestic sovereign debt holdings of 19 
basis points, well above the European average. So, the major cases of home country bias were 
showed by all those countries which were more severely affected by the sovereign debt crisis.  
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Several are the determinants of home country bias. The most important are: 
 Moral suasion: moral suasion, also referred to as financial repression11, consist in the 
government forcing domestic banks, through formal and informal mechanisms, to buy 
more domestic bonds and results in a forced home bias in banks holdings of domestic 
sovereign debt. This happens especially in moments of sovereign distress, when yields 
are high and demand is low. In fact, as shown by Becker et al. (2014), moral suasion 
was actively used by European countries during the sovereign debt crisis.  
Sovereigns benefit from home bias. Nevertheless, if the cost of holding domestic 
sovereign debt is high, the financial sector may have no incentive to acquire this debt. 
In this case, sovereigns must induce domestic banks to buy sovereign debt (Gaballo et 
al. 2016).  
There are two main channels through which the government can pressure local banks 
to buy domestic sovereign debt. First, direct government ownership. Publicly-owned 
banks indeed, should be more willing than private ones to surrender to government 
influence and purchase domestic debt at moments of sovereign distress.  
Secondly, board seats control. To give an example, as stated by Becker et al. (2015), 
the Spanish saving banks “cajas” and the Italian banks whose major shareholders are 
“fondazioni”, are strongly influenced by the government through the board of 
directors.  
Furthermore, bailed out banks are more subjected to government pressures. Indeed, 
evidence shows  that  recently  bailed out banks buy more stressed domestic debt  than  
other banks. Moreover, also the expectation that the bailout mechanisms will be 
national, and will favor those banks that hold more domestic sovereign debt can be 
seen as a sort of moral suasion. 
  “Carry trade” hypothesis: a “carry trade” strategy is a trading strategy that consists in 
borrowing at a low interest rate and investing in an asset that provides a higher rate of 
return.  
During the recent financial crisis, banks exploited the widening of yields spreads by 
betting on their subsequent convergence while short-term funding was available. 
These bets or “carry trades” were designed as investments in bonds of  government 
mostly hit by the crisis financed with short-term debt (Acharya et al. 2014). This 
behavior resulted in an increase in government debt holdings for banks. 
                                                          
11
 As can be read in Becker et al. (2014) the term financial repression dates back to work by Shaw (1973) and 
McKinnon (1973). Historically, the primary mechanism of financial repression was a discriminatory tax on the 
part of the financial system that channeled savings toward private uses, which resulted in an artificially low cost 
of domestic funding for government. 
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 Risk shifting hypothesis: following Crosignani (2014), banks reduce their lending in 
order to purchase more government bond rather than for cutting costs reasons. 
Indeed, highly leveraged banks buy domestic government bonds because of the high 
correlation with their other sources of revenue. In case of domestic sovereign default  
banks are protected by limited liability instead in case of no default home sovereign 
debt guarantees the highest payoff. This condition creates a risk-shifting incentive, so 
banks reduce lending to invest in the relatively more attractive domestic sovereign 
debt. Myopic governments permit this distortion in lending since banks act as buyer of 
last resort for government bonds.  
 Regulatory arbitrage hypothesis: the euro-area prudential regulation, under Basel III, 
gives strong preferential treatment to sovereign debt over bank loans. Exposures to 
domestic sovereign are treated as risk-free for purposes of capital charges and there 
are no concentration limits on holdings. 
Under the Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR) in fact, “exposures to Member 
States central governments and central banks denominated and funded in the domestic 
currency of that central government and central bank shall be assigned a risk weight of 
0%”12.  
Banks can improve their Tier 1 ratio
13 replacing private sector lending (that carries a 
positive risk weight) with purchases of domestic government bonds (which have 0% 
risk weight). Thus, by investing in high yield assets with low risk weights, banks 
increase their short term return on equity and they can meet capital requirements 
without the need to issue new capital. 
 Information arbitrage hypothesis: home banks might prefer domestic securities since 
their information advantage may increase during crisis. Domestic banks might, for 
example, better evaluate the increased domestic political risk compared to foreign 
investors (Altavilla et al. 2015). 
To conclude, the major effect of home country bias is to exacerbate the link between 
sovereign credit risk and banks credit risk. This happens since home bias amplifies the 
transmission of sovereign credit risk to banks credit risk through the exposures channel.  
 
                                                          
12
 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, art. 114 (4). 
13
 Tier 1 ratio is the ratio between TIER 1 capital and risk weighted assets. TIER 1 capital is the primary 
component of  bank capital in terms of quality and ability of absorbing losses. It is made up of Common Equity 
Tier 1 (CET) and Additional Tier 1 capital. They include capital instruments, retained earnings, other reserves 
and funds for general banking risks. Risk weighted assets consist in the total amount of bank assets each 
weighted for its risk. The Tier 1 ratio should be equal to at least 6% of the total risk exposure amount. 
27 
 
Chapter 3 
The Banking Union 
 
The European Union decided to set up the Banking Union in order to break the link between 
sovereign and banks credit risks and to avoid all the several problems due to this link. 
Therefore, if the Banking Union can help to break the link, it could be considered as a fourth 
phase in the relationship between banks and sovereign credit risks.  
This chapter presents the main features of the European Banking Union. In particular, the 
chapter shows the reasons underlying its creation and the ways in which it hopes to break the 
link between banks and sovereign credit risks. 
 
3.1     The structure of the Banking Union 
The Banking Union is based on three pillars: i) the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM);  
ii) the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); iii) the deposits insurance.  
All these three elements follow a common set of rules contained in the Single Rulebook. 
In addition, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was set up in order to provide an 
immediate assistance to the Member States in case of financial difficulties through a 
permanent system of firewall. Figure 8 gives a brief overview on the structure of the Banking 
Union and the tasks of its components. 
Figure 8: The structure of the Banking Union 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
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3.1.1    The Single Rulebook 
The Single Rulebook, term coined in 2009 by the European Council, represents the 
foundation of the Banking Union. It consists of a set of common rules that all financial 
institutions throughout the European Union must comply with.  
The provisions of the Single Rulebook are set out in four main legislative acts: the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR), the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 
(DGSD). 
With these four acts the Single Rulebook permits first to prevent banks crises from happening 
by setting common capital requirements. Second, when crises happen the Single Rulebook 
provides a common framework to face and orderly manage them. Moreover, it sets out the 
rules to protect depositors in a common way throughout Europe. 
The intent to create a uniform legal base for the European financial sectors came out during 
the recent crisis period. European banking legislation was based on rules which left room for 
significant divergences among countries. This has led to legal uncertainty, making possible 
for institutions to exploit regulatory loopholes, distorting competition and so on. In the crisis 
period these divergences had disruptive effects. In fact, the differences in regulatory 
requirements across Member States were one of the major causes of financial instability.  
Thus, a single Rulebook was needed in order to make the European banking sector more 
resilient, more transparent and more efficient. 
 
3.1.1.1    The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) 
In order to break the link between banks and sovereign credit risks the major tool is to 
intervene in the resolution procedure of the distress financial institution. The European Union 
acted in this direction by issuing first the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
14
 and then 
integrating it with the SRM regulation
15
.  
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive is the legislative act that regulates in a more 
comprehensive way the recovery and the resolution of distressed banks. It was enacted in 
order to reach a greater uniformity throughout Europe. In fact, all banks set up in one Member 
State of the European Union have now to comply with the BRRD.  
                                                          
14
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014. 
15
 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014. The BRRD 
established minimum harmonization rules thus, the European Union, by setting up the Banking Union, integrated 
the BRRD with the SRM Regulation in order to achieve a complete uniformity of rules relating to the settlement 
of banks in crisis. 
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To manage a bank crisis in an orderly way, the BRRD sets out a set of actions and behaviours 
that must be followed by the competent authorities. All these actions start with the prevention, 
thus, well before the crisis. 
Three phases are identified by the BRRD in the procedure for the recovery and resolution of 
banks in distress: 
 Preparation: this phase is aimed at preventing the crisis. 
In this phase financial institutions have to draw up recovery and resolution plans. 
Recovery plans are intended to remove situations of weakness while resolution plans 
are intended to ensure an orderly resolution of the institution in crisis. Thus, this 
measures are emergency plans that permit to manage adequately crisis situations 
when they occur. 
 Early intervention: the second phase coincides with the first stage of the crisis of 
banks when intervention to restore financial stability is still possible.  
In this phase competent authorities can still intervene in order to remedy to the 
deteriorated financial condition of an institution. Examples of early intervention 
measures are requirement of changes in the business strategy or in the legal and 
operational strategy.  
 Resolution or crisis management: the resolution phase occurs when the situation of 
a financial institution deteriorates beyond repair and early intervention measures are 
no longer implementable.  
The BRRD identifies four resolution tools that can be implemented: 
-Sale of business tool consists in the transfer of shares, other instrument or assets, 
rights or liabilities issued by the institution under resolution. The transfer must be 
made on commercial terms, to an institution that is not a bridge institution. 
-Bridge institution tool consists in a mechanism that permits to sell shares, other 
instruments or assets, rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution to a 
temporary structure, wholly or partially owned by public authorities and controlled by 
the resolution authority. 
-Asset separation tool consists in the transfer of assets, rights or liabilities of the 
institution under resolution to an “asset management vehicle”. This permits to 
separate clean assets from toxic ones. The main difference with the sale of business 
tool is that in the latter case the transfer is made to a private purchaser and on 
commercial terms, while in the asset separation tool the transfer is made to the asset 
management vehicle which is public owned. 
30 
 
-Bail-in tool consists in the write-down of the liabilities of the institution and in the 
conversion of debt in equity in order to restore the capital of the failing entity. In this 
way the costs arising from the failure of the institution are borne by the shareholders 
and the creditors. Moreover deposits up to € 100.000 are protected under the Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes.  
However, the regulation cannot eliminate completely a public backstop. In this 
context, the regulation provides for a government stabilization tool which can be 
obtained only in case of very extraordinary situations of systemic risk.  
An additional backstop can be found in the European Stability Mechanism as will be 
seen in the  following paragraphs. 
 
The BRRD was the first harmonization tool introduced by the European Union in order to 
face the several problems induced by the recent financial crisis. Significant was the 
introduction of the first phase of prevention. In fact during the recent financial crisis, if banks 
would have actively acted for prevention the effects of the crisis may not have been so 
devastating. 
The other significant step was the introduction of the four resolution tools. These four 
instruments on one hand permit to minimize the intervention of the State, which was a great 
problem during the crisis, on the other however they affect significantly the position of 
shareholders. This is especially visible in the sale of business tool, where the sale is done 
without the consent of shareholders, and in the bail-in tool, where the shareholders in 
particular are the one that bear the costs of the resolution. Moreover, while the bridge 
institution tool and the asset separation tool are perceived as temporary measures, the bail-in 
tool and the sale of business tool are considered as definitive measures that change the 
situation of the resolved bank.   
The BRRD was further integrated by the Banking Union regulation in order to have a more 
centralized implementation off all the actions established by the legislation.      
Looking at the framework of the Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism are responsible for the implementation of all the action of the 
three phases. In particular, the SSM intervenes in the first two phases in order to carry out all 
the prevention and early intervention activities. The SRM intervenes in the last resolution 
phase as the entity that manages the resolution.   
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3.1.2    The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism represents the first pillar of the Banking Union and is 
responsible for the supervision of all the financial institutions set up inside the Banking 
Union. It was set up on 15 October 2013 with the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 and 
it is fully operational since November 2014.  
The SSM was established in order to ensure the safety and soundness of the European 
banking system, in order to increase the financial integration and stability of the European 
market, and in order to provide consistent supervision.  
Accordingly to the legal definition, the SSM is “the system of financial supervision composed 
by the ECB and national competent authorities of participating Member States”16. The ECB is 
the body responsible for the efficient an consistent functioning of the SSM and supervises all 
the credit institutions of significant relevance (around 130 banking groups in the Euro area, 
covering more than 85% of the Euro area total banking assets). While the NCAs supervise the 
less significant ones (about 3400 institutions).   
The ECB has both supervisory and investigatory powers in order to fulfil its tasks. Other tasks 
entrusted to the ECB are the granting or withdrawing of banking licenses, the ensuring of 
compliance with EU prudential rules. 
Additionally to this direct control, the ECB carries out an indirect control on the less 
significant institutions. The direct supervision of these less significant institution is in the 
responsibility of the NCAs which are subjected to the control of the ECB.  
As regards the decision-making process within the SSM, the ECB has set up a new entity
17
, 
the Supervisory Board, which carries out all the supervisory tasks. The decisions proposed by 
the Supervisory Board must be approved by the Governing Council.  
As for the international framework, the ECB cooperates with non-SSM supervisors. The ECB 
plays a strong role as host supervisor for the banks from countries outside the Euro area.  
Thus, the SSM is an integrated system based on cooperation between the ECB, which figures 
as the largest supervisor in the world, and the national authorities, to deliver a European 
supervision, without national bias (Nouy 2014). 
The establishment of the SSM was the first important step towards the Banking Union. It 
permits to have a greater uniformity throughout Europe, a greater coherence in the banking 
system and, having as central point the BCE, it assures that all the tasks are carried out  more 
                                                          
16
 Article 2, Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.  
17
 The ECB initially was only responsible for the monetary policy function. Now with the introduction of the 
SSM the ECB is responsible also for the supervisory tasks. Thus, as stated by article 25 CRD IV, it is important 
to maintain separated the two function of the ECB. For these reason the new Supervisory Board was established. 
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correctly and more efficiently with respect to the past. However, it was set up in a period of 
great distress. And this, as seen above, created some obstacles to its effective implementation.  
 
3.1.3    The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
The Single Resolution Mechanism is the second pillar of the Banking Union and is the 
necessary complement to the Single Supervisory Mechanism.   
The Single Resolution Mechanism consists of a system of rules and procedures common for 
all the financial institutions inside the Banking Union for the prevention of a crisis and the 
resolution of a failing entity. In this way, the European authorities want to ensure that when a 
bank is failing or likely to fail it can be resolved in a more orderly way with respect to the 
past, without systemic repercussions on the financial system, while minimizing reliance on 
public support (Bruzzone et al. 2015). 
The SRM was established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, of 15 July 2014, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and is fully operational since 1 January 2016. It bases its 
functioning on the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) and the SRM regulation. 
The SRM is made up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) which is entrusted with a 
centralized power of resolution. The SRB is the owner of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) 
whose purpose is to support financially the resolution procedures when the other measures are 
not sufficient. The SRF is financed by all financial institutions in the participating Member 
States. 
Moreover, the SRB is supported by the National Resolution Authorities of each participating 
Member State. Other authorities involved in the resolution process are the European 
Commission, the European Council and the ECB, which carry out specific tasks related to the 
most political sensitive issues.  
As for the application of the SRM, it covers all the institutions supervised by the SSM, both 
significant and less significant. The SRB is responsible for the resolution of the largest banks 
and of cross-border institutions (all those institutions also subjected to the direct supervision 
of the ECB), while all the remaining banks are subjected to the National Resolution 
Authorities.  
Moreover, the SRM structure ensures that the first who bears the losses in case of a resolution 
procedure is no longer the sovereign but the shareholders and the creditors of the failing 
banks. This is possible, in particular, thanks to the bail-in resolution tool imposed by the 
BRRD. Thus, the SRM is the element of the Banking Union that mostly should allow to break 
the link between banks and sovereign credit risks. However, the introduction of the bail-in has 
made investors more reluctant to underwrite shares and obligations of banks since those 
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became more and more risky from the moment in which the regulation has established that the 
first who bears the losses are shareholders and creditors. Thus, the bail-in has to be structured 
in a correct way in order to avoid an inefficient problem of disinvestment and withdrawal of 
funds.  
 
3.1.4    The deposits insurance 
The deposits insurance is the third pillar of the Banking Union. Its significance is due to the 
fact that the strengthening of deposits insurance increases the stability of the financial sector. 
This because a deposits insurance reinforces depositors confidence and reduces the 
probability of a bank run in case of financial distress. 
The current system of deposits insurance is constituted by the set of all national Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes (DGSs). These already ensure that all covered deposits up to € 100.00018 
are protected. In particular, the national DGSs have the task to intervene in the crisis of a bank 
in order to repay depositors within the limits provided by law or in the higher limits set 
voluntary by the deposits insurance scheme.  
However, since national DGSs can be vulnerable to local shocks, in November 2015 the 
European Commission proposed to establish a unique deposits guarantee scheme, the 
European Deposits Insurance Scheme (EDIS). As was seen above, despite the positive effects 
envisaged by the official proposal, the EDIS is not yet in place. In fact many countries, 
especially Germany and other Nordic states like Denmark, take position against the proposal 
of the European Commission. 
The States that take position against  the EDIS believe that a common insurance scheme at the 
European level is possible only after that the several risks of banks, in particular those related 
to the holdings of national government debt, are reduced. In fact, Germany and the other 
Nordic countries are worried that they may disproportionally pay to rescue depositors in other 
countries since the risk levels of banks across Europe are not homogeneous. For example, 
banks in Greece are more likely to fail than the German ones so Greece will benefit more than 
Germany from the EDIS. As a consequence, the EDIS will pay more for Greece than for 
Germany. This leads to a disproportional payment across States. Moreover, a common 
insurance could lead to moral hazard across the States, in particular the riskier ones. A 
                                                          
18
 The original DGSD, Directive 94/19, required only a minimum coverage amount of € 20.000. It was a 
minimum harmonization measure and this resulted in a variety of different DGSs. During the recent financial 
crisis, this induced several depositors to transfer their funds to banks in countries with more favorable guarantee 
schemes. The European Commission, in order to avoid distortionary competition and to increase financial 
stability and confidence in the market, amended  the directive and the coverage amount was set to € 100.000, 
uniformly throughout all the Member States. 
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solution proposed by the States is to average the contributions to the insurance fund for the 
risk of the sovereigns. 
Another point of conflict is the independence of the insurance fund from the Single 
Resolution Fund. In fact, the proposal of the Commission envisages that the new Deposit and 
Insurance Fund will be managed by the Single Resolution Board which also manages the 
Single Resolution Fund. Several States take position against the double management of the 
Single Resolution Board since this could lead to significant conflicts of interest.     
Thus, the EDIS implementation will be delayed. However, while these concerns should be 
taken seriously, it must be recognized that an incomplete Banking Union, if allowed to persist 
for long, can easily become an additional source of uncertainty and risk. Policymakers will 
have to make several modifications to the proposal in the next time which have to consider all 
the financial and legal consequences of the EDIS. 
 
3.1.5    The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
The European Stability Mechanism is an intergovernmental organization created on 27 
September 2012. It represents a permanent firewall for the Eurozone Member States19. It 
should safeguard and provide instant access to financial assistance programmes for Member 
States of the Eurozone in financial difficulty, with a maximum lending capacity of 500 
billion. Eurozone Member States have to contribute to ESM capital. The major contributors 
are Germany, France and Italy. 
ESM is composed of the Ministers of Finance of each Member State. It has replaced the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism 
(EFSM). 
Initially, ESM was created as a backstop for Eurozone countries. It was used only to provide 
financial support to Member States in troubles. In particular, ESM provided loans to the 
European countries that experienced or were threatened by financial difficulties. Cyprus and 
Greece are examples of Member States that applied for ESM financial support. 
Successively, with the creation of the Banking Union, this backstop role was accompanied by 
other tasks related to the support of the financial sector. Nowadays in fact, the ESM can also 
help and support troubled financial sectors of Member States by intervening in the 
recapitalization of banks in crisis. In particular, ESM intervenes in case of bank resolution 
when a Member State asks for assistance in recapitalizing a financial institution and neither 
                                                          
19 Only Eurozone Member State can apply for ESM financial assistance. EU Member States outside the 
Eurozone have no access to the funds provided by the ESM, but can apply for rescue loans from EU Balance of 
Payments programs, IMF and bilateral loans. 
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the private market nor the Member State will be able to conduct the recapitalization on their 
own without causing increasing financial distress. In this case, the ESM could buy the banks, 
manage the banks and appoint directors of the banks. ESM could acquire equity shares, invest 
in those banks and then reform them.  
Moreover, each financial institution in trouble will be directly financed, so the support is not 
considered a State aid. 
Thus, the ESM applies to systemic banks under recovery or resolution when neither bail-in by 
shareholders and creditors nor the use of the Single Resolution Fund have been sufficient. 
Hence, the ESM acts as an ultimate backstop.  
 
3.2     The fourth phase: the Banking Union period 
The Banking Union was established in response to the severe consequences of the recent 
financial crisis. In fact, the earlier European framework, which combined national banking 
policy with European integration, was no longer able to sustain financial stability and the 
breakup of the Euro area could not be ruled out. It was time to create a common setup for the 
banking sector that was no longer national but wide spread across Europe. 
The intent underlying the creation of the Banking Union was to make financial institutions 
and markets more stable and more resilient. Therefore, breaking the link between sovereign 
and banks credit risks became the main objective of the European Union which decided to set 
up the Banking Union. This was highlighted in the summit of Euro area heads of State and 
governments of 28 and 29 June 2012 where the leaders declared: “we affirm that it is 
imperative to break the vicious cycle between banks and sovereign”. 
For these reasons the Banking Union could be considered as a fourth phase in the relation 
between credit risk of banks and credit risk of sovereigns. The Banking Union should be seen 
as the final phase in which the link between the two risks is broken thanks to new common 
supervisory and resolution authorities. A common framework for supervision and resolution, 
in fact, should ensure that banks credibility will depend more and more on the specific risk 
profile of the banks rather than on the financial strength of the Member States in which they 
are based.  
However, the new setup does not eliminate at all the intervention of the State, as will be seen 
in the next paragraphs, and the presence of national entities is a basic element of the new 
supervision and resolution mechanisms. This may not eliminate at all differences across 
countries and the influences of the sovereigns on the financial sectors.  
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Thus, many are the positive effects related to the establishment of the Banking Union. It must 
be recognized that the project was carried on very fast considering all the steps that it has 
taken. Moreover, as argued by Angeloni (2016) the banking sector faced a recovery between 
mid-2012 to mid-2015, three years that coincide with the launch of the European Banking 
Union and the establishment of its first pillar. This means that the establishment of the 
Banking Union had positive effects on the banking sector.  
The first step towards a complete Banking Union was the establishment of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanisms, which is entrusted with the supervision of all the European 
financial institutions. Thanks to a common supervision banks should become stronger and 
more immune to shocks. Moreover, a common supervision should ensure an effective 
enforcement of stricter prudential requirements for banks throughout Europe. Examples are 
the new capital requirements to which all banks of the Euro area are subjected, independently 
of their “nationality”. This, in turn, should make EU banks more solid, enabling them to 
manage in a more adequate way the risks linked to their activities and absorb all the losses in 
which they may incur. 
Consequently, the confidence in all banks inside the Banking Union should increase since all 
banks are subjected to the same supervisor. This results from the fact that banks even if 
located in different Member States are subjected to the same rules and requirements, and 
regulations are applied in the same way throughout the Eurozone.  
For all these reasons the creation of a common supervision mechanism was necessary in order 
to eliminate the shortcomings of the precedent legislation and the lack in transparency that 
characterized the precedent setup. The recent financial crisis, in fact, highlighted the very 
different situations of the banking sectors across countries. However, the SSM was introduced 
in a period in which the financial crisis was very severe, which made the desired effects more 
difficult to achieve. An example are the strict capital requirements to which banks were 
subjected. Banks had to increase their capital, most of the time significantly, in a period in 
which investors were reluctant to subscribe a capital increase. This made a bad situation 
worse. 
Moreover, the second step in the establishment of the Banking Union was the introduction of 
a new common bank resolution procedure throughout Europe. The major aim of this new 
resolution mechanism is to ensure that failing banks will be resolved without taxpayers 
money. This will limit the negative effects on public debt and sovereign credit risk. In fact, 
under the Banking Union the resolution of a bank will be financed mainly by its shareholders 
and its creditors. The intent of the European Union to avoid the intervention of the State in the 
resolution of a failing bank is important and necessary in order to break the link between 
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sovereigns and banks. However, by introducing the bail-in the situation of shareholders is 
significantly affected. The concerns about banks default make investors and savers more 
reluctant to invest and deposit money in banks. And this, in the current period, is also 
disadvantageous for banks, because of the high capital requirement imposed by the 
authorities. 
The last step towards a complete Banking Union is the establishment of a common deposit 
insurance scheme throughout Europe, the European Deposits Insurance Scheme. This should 
ensures that deposits, independently from the bank where they are set, will be subjected to the 
same level of protection. The EDIS should increase the confidence in banks inside the 
Banking Union by reducing the probability of a bank run. Thanks to the EDIS depositors 
should be more confident to be protected despite of the State in which the bank is located. In 
fact, the EDIS being European is not characterized by the vulnerability to large local shocks 
shown by national deposit guarantee schemes. Although the EDIS is presented with a lot of 
positive effects several States, in particular Germany and other Nordic States, are taking 
position against it as will be seen in the next paragraphs. Thus, it will be take a long time 
since a European insurance scheme will be established.  
The recent financial crisis made it necessary to build up the Banking Union, in particular, it 
anticipated a step that the European Union would have done in the future to complete the 
European Monetary Union. However, one must bear in mind that the Banking Union will 
affect and change significantly the banking sector with respect to the past, and this in a period 
of significant distress.  
Breaking the link between banks and sovereign credit risks is thus the major aim of the 
Banking Union. However, there are other important objectives underlying the creation of the 
Banking Union. One is to restore financial market integration which was undermined by the 
recent financial crisis. The financial crisis, in fact, pushed fragmentation to levels similar to 
those seen before the Euro was introduced. One of the reasons for this decline in financial 
integration was the increasing concerns of investors about the financial situation of foreign 
financial sectors. Investors, thus, showed an increasing preference for national institutions as a 
result of the loss of trust in international markets. Thus, national bias increased an lead to 
fragmentation at national level. 
Moreover, it is important to restore financial integration in the Euro area since it contributes 
to the development of the financial system for example by increasing competition, expanding 
markets and offering greater opportunities for geographical risk diversification. This will 
improve the overall stability and reduce problems of asymmetry of information. Also 
significant is the fact that financial integration contributes to GDP growth. Maudos et al. 
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(2015) states that from 1999 to 2007, the economic impact of progress in the degree of 
financial integration contributed to 0,227 percentage point of annual GDP growth in the  
EU – 15 countries. Moreover, the financial fragmentation during the crisis implied a fall in the 
annual growth rate. Thus, establishing the Banking Union, that envisages more integration in 
the financial sector, should have positive effects on the economic growth. 
Moreover, as stated by Costâncio (2015), the presence of the sovereign-bank link and the 
more and more pronounced fragmentation made the correct transmission of monetary policies 
increasingly difficult. Restore the correct functioning of the banking sector permits to 
reestablish the correct transmission of the monetary policy to the real economy through the 
Euro area. 
Thus, a Banking Union is really needed in order to solve the several problems brought by the 
shortcomings highlighted by the recent financial crisis and in order to better face new crises. 
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Chapter 4 
The model 
 
This chapter presents the main features of the theoretical model elaborated by Acharya et al. 
(2014) in order to better understand the empirical analysis. In particular it focuses on the 
structure and the equilibrium results of the model.  
The following empirical analysis (Chapter 5) and what said above are based on the theoretical 
model presented by Acharya et al. (2014). The authors, in fact, elaborated a model that 
explains the three phases in the relationship between banks credit risk and sovereign credit 
risk. 
 
4.1     The structure of the model 
The model is constructed over three periods: t=0, 1 and 2. There are three economic sectors:         
the financial sector, the corporate sector (or non-financial sector) and the government. 
Financial and corporate sector constitute the productive economy. The outputs of the 
economy are consumed by a representative consumer. All agents are risk neutral.  
Figure 9: Timeline of the model 
 
Source: Acharya et al. 2014. 
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Figure 9 shows the timeline of the model. As will be seen more in detail in the following 
paragraphs, the financial sector faces a problem of maximization of its revenues coming from 
the supply of financial services; at the same time it has to remain solvent. As can be seen in 
figure 9, the financial sector decides how much financial services to supply at time t=0 and 
gets the revenues at time t=1. At time t=1 it knows if it will be solvent. For what concerns the 
government, it acts in order to maximize the output of the economy and thus the welfare of 
the consumer. In particular, it sustains the financial sector by doing a transfer. It does it in 
order to avoid the liquidation of the financial sector which is detrimental for the economy. 
Thus, the government decides at t=0 the magnitude of the transfer and the tax rate. Only at 
time t=2 the government levies taxes and knows if it is solvent. For what concerns the 
corporate sector, it wants to maximize its payoffs deriving from actual activities and 
investments in new projects. It does this by deciding at time t=0 how much financial services 
to buy at time t=0 and how much capital to invest in new projects at time t=1. 
 
4.1.1    The financial sector 
The financial sector manager faces a problem of maximization of payoffs. In particular, at 
time t=0 he has to decide the amount of financial services to supply in order to maximize the 
net expected payoffs at time t=1. The problem to solve is represented by the following 
equation: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠0
𝑠
𝐸0 [(𝑤𝑠 𝑠0
𝑠 − 𝐿1 + Ã1 + 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐵0) ∗ 1{−𝐿1+Ã1+𝐴𝐺+𝐵0>0}] − 𝑐(𝑠0
𝑠) (1) 
where 𝑠0
𝑠 is the amount of financial services supplied by the financial sector at time t=0, 𝑤𝑠  is 
the return per unit of financial services determined in equilibrium, 𝑐(𝑠0) are the costs, 
measured in units of consumption good, of the production of 𝑠0 unit of financial services. The 
production costs are assumed to be increasing in the amount of financial services produced, 
that is  𝑐′(𝑠0) > 0, and convex, that is 𝑐′′(𝑠0) > 0.  
Moreover, 𝐿1 is the face value of the liabilities of the financial sector that mature at time t=1, 
 Ã1 and 𝐴𝐺  represent the values of the two types of assets held by the financial sector. 𝐴𝐺  
represents the value of the financial sector holdings of the existing stock of government bonds 
(already issued before the bailout), Ã1 represents the value of all the other assets held by the 
financial sector at time t=1.  𝐵0 is the transfer that the government makes to the financial 
sector at time t=0. 
The financial sector manager obtains revenues from his activity only if the value of the assets 
(Ã1 + 𝐴𝐺) exceeds the value of the liabilities (𝐿1). This solvency condition is represented by 
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the indicator function for the expression {−𝐿1 + Ã1 + 𝐴𝐺 + 𝐵0 > 0}20. In case of insolvency 
the debtholders get all the assets and the wage revenues of the financial sector. 
From a structural point of view, the financial sector is highly leveraged and highly exposed to 
systematic risk. This makes it particularly susceptible to debt overhang, that causes important 
distortion in investments, and to runs. Moreover, this makes financial sector debt difficult to 
restructure. Thus, the intervention of the government is needed to resolve the problem of debt 
overhang. 
Finally, the financial sector is large so, the resources needed to resolve a crisis are large also 
with respect to tax revenues. This creates important trades off in the decisions that the 
government has to take in the case that a bailout is needed. 
 
4.1.2    The corporate sector 
The corporate sector, or non-financial sector, has a capital stock 𝐾0 at time t=0. The corporate 
sector wants to maximize the net payoffs that occur at time t=1 and t=2. The problem that has 
to be solved for the corporate sector is represented by the equation: 
  𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠0
𝑑 , 𝐾1
𝐸0 [𝑓(𝐾0, 𝑠0
𝑑) − 𝑤𝑠𝑠0
𝑑 + (1 − 𝜃0)Ṽ(𝐾1) − (𝐾1−𝐾0)]      (2) 
where 𝑓 is the production function of the sector; 𝐾0, the initial capital, and 𝑠0
𝑑, the amount of 
the financial services demanded by the corporate sector, are the inputs of the production 
function. The output of 𝑓 is deterministic and consumption goods are produced at time t=1. 
The underlying assumption states that 𝑓 is increasing in both inputs and concave.  
At t=1 the corporate sector has to decide how much capital 𝐾1 to invest, at cost 𝐾1−𝐾0, in a 
project Ṽ whose payoffs are realized at t=2.  It is the continuation value of the corporate sector 
and is subjected to uncertainty. The expected payoffs of the project are given by 𝑉(𝐾1) =
𝐸1[Ṽ(𝐾1)]. These are a function of the level of invested capital 𝐾1. The underlying 
assumption is 𝑉′(𝐾1) > 0 and 𝑉′′(𝐾1) < 0, that is the expected payoffs are increasing in the 
level of invested capital and concave. 
At time t=2 the payoffs of the project are taxed at a tax rate 𝜃0 set by the government in order 
to pay back its debt. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
The term  𝑤𝑠 𝑠0
𝑠  is omitted from the solvency condition for reasons of simplicity without affecting the results. 
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4.1.3    The government 
The aim of the government is to maximize the total output of the economy and, consequently, 
the welfare of the consumer. Thus, the government has to reduce the problem of debt 
overhang of the financial sector in order to increase the provision of financial services and, in 
turn, the output of the economy. In order to do this, at time t=0 the government issues new 
bonds and transfers these to the balance sheet of the financial sector
21
. The new bond issued 
are equal to the old one, they mature all at time t=2 and are repaid with the tax revenues 
gained by taxing (in t=2) the payoffs of the corporate sector at the tax rate 𝜃0 (determined at 
t=0). Thus, after the transfer to the financial sector the government has 𝑁𝐵+𝑁𝐷 amount of 
bonds outstanding, where 𝑁𝐷 is the number of old bond and 𝑁𝐵 is the amount of new bond 
issued for the transfer. The face value of a bond is equal to one so the face value of the total 
outstanding debt is equal to the number of outstanding bonds. 
The government sets the tax rate at time t=0 and the taxes are levied at t=2 when the payoffs 
of  Ṽ  are realized. The realized taxes are equal to 𝜃0Ṽ(𝐾1) and are used to pay bondholders of 
both new issued and old bonds, 𝑁𝐵+𝑁𝐷. If the tax revenues are higher than the outflows for 
debt repayment the government runs a surplus. Otherwise the government defaults on its debt. 
It is assumed that by defaulting the government suffers a deadweight loss of D. This 
represents the loss of government reputation at an international level, the domestic loss of 
government credibility, the degradation of the legal system and so on. Thus, since default is 
costly there is incentive to avoid it. 
Therefore, the problem faced by the government is to maximize the expected utility of the 
consumer that consumes the combined output of the financial and the corporate sectors. This 
problem is represented by the equation:  
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜃0, 𝑁𝐵
𝐸0 [𝑓(𝐾0, 𝑠0) + Ṽ(𝐾1) − 𝑐(𝑠0) − (𝐾1−𝐾0) − 1𝑑𝑒𝑓𝐷 + Ã1]     (3) 
where 𝑓(𝐾0, 𝑠0) is the production function; its inputs are the initial capital stock 𝐾0 and the 
amount of financial services provided in equilibrium 𝑠0. As in the objective function of the 
financial sector,  𝑐(𝑠0) are the production costs of 𝑠0 units of financial services. Ṽ(𝐾1) are the 
payoffs of the project in which the corporate sector invests, Ã1 represent the value of the 
assets of the financial sector, not considering the government bonds holdings.  1𝑑𝑒𝑓 is an 
                                                          
21
 The instruments of the government are simplified since the model does not focus on the optimal structure of 
the bailout. This does not affect the results. It is only important that the bailout is not free for the government, 
(i.e., it involves a net transfer from the government to the financial sector), and the larger is the debt overhang 
problem, the greater is the cost of the bailout (Acharya et al., 2014). 
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indicator function. It takes the value 1 when the government defaults, that is when the tax 
revenues are not enough to pay back the outstanding debt (𝜃0𝑉(𝐾1) < 𝑁𝐵 + 𝑁𝐷), 0 otherwise.  
The maximization problem is subjected to the budget constraint 𝐵0 = 𝑃0𝑁𝐵 (where 𝑃0 is the 
price of government bonds, both old and new, determined in equilibrium), and to the 
simultaneous choices of the financial and the corporate sector. 
In addition on each government bond there is a CDS contract that protects the bond buyer in 
case of government default. This contract pays to the buyer the difference between the face 
value of the bond and the recovery value after default. The CDS contract matures at time t=2 
and at the same time the buyer pays the CDS fee, which is equal to 1 − 𝑃0. 
 
4.1.4    The representative consumer 
The representative consumer consumes the output of the economy. The consumer has wealth 
W which he allocates between consumption and bonds and equity of the government and of 
the financial and the corporate sectors. 
The consumer is risk neutral thus he has no time - discounting. He chooses at time t=0 the 
portfolio allocation which maximizes its payoffs. Thus, it solves the following equation:  
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑛𝑖 ,
𝐸0 [∑ 𝑛𝑖Ṕ(𝑖)𝑖 + (𝑊 − ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝑃(𝑖)𝑖 )]    (4) 
where  𝑃(𝑖) and Ṕ(𝑖) are the price and the payoff of asset i respectively and 𝑛𝑖 is the optimal 
amount of asset i. 
The first order condition implies that the equilibrium price of an asset is given by its expected 
payoff,  𝑃(𝑖) = 𝐸0[Ṕ(𝑖)]. 
 
4.2     Equilibrium results 
The equilibrium analysis starts with the maximization problem of the financial sector.  
First of all, p(Ã) represents the probability density of Ã. Then, Ã1min represents the minimum 
realization of  Ã1 that permits to the financial sector to not default. Thus, the first order 
condition of the financial sector becomes: 
 𝑤𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑙 − 𝑐′(𝑠0
𝑠) = 0      (5) 
Where 𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑙 is the probability that the financial sector is solvent at t=1. 
The analysis goes on with the maximization problem of the corporate sector at t=0.  
The demand for financial services 𝑠0
𝑑 of the corporate sector at time t=0 is given by the  
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following first order condition: 
 
𝜕𝑓(𝐾0,𝑠0
𝑑)
𝜕𝑠0
𝑑 = 𝑤𝑠     (6) 
In equilibrium the demand and the supply of financial services are equal (Acharya et al., 
2014): 
ŝ0
𝑑 = ŝ0
𝑠 . 
The two first order condition of the financial sector and the corporate sector show how debt 
overhang affects the provision of financial services. 
In particular, the marginal cost of an extra unit of services to the economy, 𝑐′(𝑠0), is less than 
the marginal gain, 𝑤𝑠, when the probability of insolvency of the financial sector is positive. In 
this case the allocation is suboptimal (Acharya et al., 2014). In fact, the probability of 
liquidation (𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑙 < 1) makes the social and private marginal benefit of an increase in the 
provision of financial services differ from each other. Thus, there is underprovision of 
financial services with respect to the first best case, that is when there is no insolvency 
probability (𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑙 = 1). For this reason an increase in the transfer 𝐵0, made by the 
government, leads to an increase in the provision of financial services by raising the 
probability 𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑙   that the financial sector is solvent at time t=1 (Acharya et al., 2014). 
Thus, the intervention of the government, by making a transfer to the financial sector (which 
figures as a sort of bailout), can alleviate the underprovision of financial services.  
 
4.2.1    First case: optimal transfer under certainty and government solvency constraint 
As for the optimization problem of the government, it is suitable to first consider a simplified 
setup. Therefore, two simplifying assumptions are introduced: 
 The variance of output in time t=2 is zero, thus  Ṽ(𝐾1) = 𝑉(𝐾1); this means that there 
is no uncertainty. 
 Government has to maintain solvency when establishing its policies. 
The second assumption implies that the government can issue only an amount of bonds that it 
can completely repay; this depends on the amount of tax revenues that the government 
decides to raise. Thus, since by the first assumption the tax revenues are exactly equal to 𝑇, 
and following assumption two, the government constraint becomes 𝑁𝐵 + 𝑁𝐷 = 𝑇. This means 
that the new issued bonds, 𝑁𝐵, and the already issued ones, 𝑁𝐷, have to be completely 
covered by the tax revenues, 𝑇. 
Thus, the optimal transfer to the financial sector becomes 𝐵0 = 𝜃0𝑉(𝐾1) − 𝑁𝐷.  
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Looking at the first order condition with respect to the tax revenue 𝑇, it can be derived that 
the optimal tax revenues are equal to the marginal gain and the marginal loss of increasing tax 
revenues. Thus, increasing tax revenues increase the transfer 𝐵0. Moreover, an increasing 
transfer induces an increase in the supply of financial services by the financial sector. Thus, 
all else equal, the marginal gain is large when the financial sector’s probability of solvency is 
low and the debt overhang is significant (Acharya et al., 2014). Moreover, it has to be 
considered that increasing tax revenues can lead to a decrease in investments, and this causes 
a marginal underinvestment loss for the economy. 
Thus, under the first two simplifying assumptions there is a unique optimal tax revenue 𝑇, 
which is generated by an optimal tax rate that is strictly less than 𝜃0
𝑚𝑎𝑥22. The optimal 
transfer 𝐵0 is given by 𝐵0 = 𝑇 − 𝑁𝐷. The optimal tax revenue 𝑇 is increasing in the debt 
overhang of the financial sector (𝐿1) and in the amount of existing government debt (𝑁𝐷). In 
fact, the marginal gain of a higher transfer is larger when there is a bigger distortion in the 
provision of financial services. Thus, the government raises more tax revenues to generate a 
larger transfer in case of more severe financial sector debt overhang. This is shown in figure 
10. 
Figure 10: Tax revenues given debt overhang and existing government debt 
 
The figure shows the behaviour of the tax revenues for different levels of debt overhang of the financial 
sector and for different levels of existing government debt. As can be seen in the left panel tax revenues 
increase with the level of debt overhang of the financial sector. In the right panel the tax revenues 
increase with higher existing government debt. Source: Acharya et al. 2014. Author’s own modification. 
Figure 10 shows the behaviour of the tax revenues for different levels of debt overhang of the 
financial sector and for different levels of government existing debt. Accordingly to what said 
                                                          
22
 The optimal tax rate is less then 𝜃0
𝑚𝑎𝑥 due to the Laffer curve property of tax revenues. Moreover, the optimal 
tax rate will be strictly greater than zero if there is financial sector debt overhang (𝑝𝑠𝑜𝑙  𝑣 < 1) since the transfer 
provides a marginal benefit (Acharya et al., 2014). 
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above the tax revenues increase with higher levels of debt overhang, as shown in the left 
panel. Moreover, the tax revenues increase also with higher levels of existing government 
debt. The figure anticipates also that at some point, where in the figure there is a discontinuity 
in the line, for the government is no longer advantageous to increase tax revenues. In fact, as 
will be seen in the next paragraphs, for high levels of debt overhang and high level of existing 
government debt, for the government it is more favourable to dilute existing debt instead of 
increasing tax revenues. 
Moreover, the optimal transfer is increasing in the financial sector debt overhang (𝐿1) and 
decreasing in the amount of existing government debt (𝑁𝐷). In fact, since the underinvestment 
cost of taxation is convex, optimal tax revenues increase less than one-for-one with existing 
government debt, and a greater existing government debt is associated with a smaller optimal 
transfer (Acharya et al., 2014). 
Figure 11: Transfer size given debt overhang and existing government debt 
 
The figure shows the behaviour of the transfer size for different levels of debt overhang of the financial 
sector and for different levels of existing government debt. As can be seen in the left panel the transfer 
size increases with the level of debt overhang of the financial sector. In the right panel the transfer size 
decreases with higher existing government debt. Source: Acharya et al. 2014. Author’s own modification. 
Figure 11 shows the behaviour of the optimal transfer for different levels of debt overhang of 
the financial sector and for different levels of existing government debt. Accordingly to what 
said above the optimal transfer size increases with increasing levels of debt overhang as 
shown in the left panel. While the optimal transfer size decreases for higher levels of existing 
debt, as shown in the right panel. Also in this case the figure, in particular the right panel, 
shows that at a certain point things changes. For the government in case of very high debt it is 
more advantageous to default and issue a very high transfer.  
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4.2.2    Second case: optimal transfer when the government has the possibility to default  
To go more in depth the second simplifying assumption is removed. Thus, the government 
has no longer to maintain solvency and it can default. Moreover, the first assumption is still 
maintained. Thus, the current setting of the model is characterized by no uncertainty about 
future output and tax revenues and by the fact that the government defaults only in the case 
that it issues new bonds 𝑁𝐵 in excess of the tax revenues that remain after having repaid all 
the already existing bonds, 𝑇 − 𝑁𝐷.    It is useful to consider the government insolvency ratio 
given by: 
𝐻 =
𝑁𝐵 + 𝑁𝐷
𝑇
 
This is the ratio between the total face value of the debt and the expected tax revenues. It 
maps the decision on how much new debt to issue. When there is no uncertainty (so that the 
first assumption is respected) default happens when the government raises H above 1, thus 
when the debt to repay is higher than the tax revenues with which to repay it. Raising H above 
one, hence making government default, has both benefits and costs. The costs are represented 
by the deadweight loss of default D. The benefits are given by the fact that increasing H 
above one generates a larger transfer by diluting the claim of existing debt on tax revenues. 
This allows the government to increase the transfer without increasing taxes and incurring in 
greater underinvestment (Acharya et al., 2014). 
Thus, when there is no uncertainty the optimal choice of H is either 1 or infinity since it 
would be suboptimal to incur in the deadweight loss D without having extracted the total 
benefits from dilution. Raising H to infinity allows the government to completely dilute 
existing debt, thereby using all tax revenues for the transfer. Thus defaulting can be 
beneficial. The benefits from defaulting are affected by several factors. In particular, the net 
benefit of defaulting is increasing in the financial sector debt overhang (𝐿1) and in the 
amount of existing government debt (𝑁𝐷). In fact, an increase in the financial sector overhang 
increases the marginal benefits from the transfer and, as defaulting enables the sovereign to 
generate a larger transfer, the financial sector overhang increases the net benefits of 
defaulting. Moreover an increase in  the amount of existing government debt implies a larger 
benefit from defaulting by freeing-up more resources for the optimal transfer and by 
decreasing the optimal tax rate and associated underinvestment (Acharya et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the net benefit of defaulting is decreasing in the fraction of existing government 
debt held by the financial sector and in the deadweight loss D. In fact, an increase in the 
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amount of government bonds held by the financial sector makes default less desirable since it 
generates significant collateral damages to the balance sheet of the financial sector. 
 
4.2.3    Third case: optimal transfer under uncertainty 
Finally also the first assumption is removed so that uncertainty on future output  Ṽ(𝐾1) is 
introduced. The current setup of the model is now characterized by uncertainty on the future 
output and by the possibility that the government defaults. 
With uncertainty the sovereign no longer chooses only between defaulting or no defaulting. 
Now it chooses both the optimal value of tax revenues (which was given in the previous cases 
with no uncertainty) and insolvency ratio H. 
Raising H dilutes existing bondholders since it raises the total face value of debt without 
increasing expected tax revenues. By capturing a greater fraction of tax revenues, it generates 
a bigger transfer without the need to worsen underinvestment. The cost of this strategy is that 
it raises the sovereign probability of default. Hence, the sovereign sacrifices its own 
creditworthiness in order to alleviate debt overhang in the financial sector (Acharya et al., 
2014). 
Thus, when financial sector overhang is large enough, any further increase in it induces the 
government to increase the insolvency ratio instead of increasing tax revenues. This is shown 
in figure 12. 
Figure 12: Insolvency ratio given debt overhang and existing government debt 
 
The figure shows the behaviour of the insolvency ratio for different levels of debt overhang of the 
financial sector and for different levels of existing government debt. As can be seen in the left panel the 
insolvency ratio increases with the level of debt overhang of the financial sector. In the right panel the 
insolvency ratio increases with higher existing government debt. Source: Acharya et al. 2014. Author’s 
own modification. 
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Figure 12 shows the behaviour of the insolvency ratio for different levels of debt overhang of 
the financial sector and for different levels of existing government debt. In case of high levels 
of debt overhang for the government is suitable to raise the insolvency ratio; this in fact rises 
for increasing levels of debt overhang, as shown in the left panel. Moreover, as shown in the 
right panel, for high levels of existing government debt the government increases the 
insolvency ratio. 
Moreover increasing the insolvency ratio triggers an increase in the sovereign’s probability of 
default, which raises the credit risk of the sovereign. Financial credit risk thus “spills over” 
onto sovereign credit risk (Acharya et al., 2014). 
It is important to note that the government chooses to sacrifice its credit worthiness. In fact 
tax revenues are below the maximum value. The government instead of increasing H could 
increase the tax revenues but it chooses to dilute existing debt in order to avoid 
underinvestment problems. 
The three different setups of the model highlight a loop between financial sector credit risk 
and sovereign credit risk. In fact, in order to alleviate the severe debt overhang of the financial 
sector, represented by a large 𝐿1, the government has to make a large transfer to the financial 
sector. When the underinvestment costs of taxation are high, the government cannot increase 
tax revenues in order to make the transfer; thus, it has to raise the insolvency ratio and 
consequently  dilute existing debt. By doing this the sovereign accepts a positive probability 
of default resulting in a positive relation between the level of sovereign debt and credit risk. In 
this way, financial sector credit risk “spills over” into sovereign credit risk (Acharya et al., 
2014). Moreover, this happens especially when the level of sovereign debt is very high and to 
increase tax revenues is not the most efficient measure. In this case dilution of existing debt is 
more likely. This is what happens for example during crises where  existing sovereign debt is 
usually high due to the several stimulus packages.   
Moreover, a feedback loop generates from the credit risk of the sovereign to the credit risk of 
the financial sector once the sovereign assumes higher credit risk. In fact, when the sovereign 
becomes susceptible to credit risk, a negative shock that affects the creditworthiness of the 
sovereign feeds back to the financial sector credit risk.    
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Chapter 5 
Empirical analysis 
 
In this chapter we test empirically the presence of a link between sovereign credit risk and 
banks credit risk in Italy. In particular, following the work of Acharya et al. (2014), we test 
whether the link is present also for the Italian sovereign and the Italian banks, and whether the 
link is present only after the bailout period or if it is due to other reasons.  
Moreover, we test whether the link is broken with the establishment of the Banking Union. 
Therefore, we analyzed also data of the period after the establishment of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism.  
To carry out our analysis we use data on banks and sovereign CDS spreads as measure of 
credit risk. 
The chapter is structured as follows: a first paragraph gives an overview on the Italia situation 
from the beginning of the crisis till now; the next paragraphs present the data, the graphical 
analysis and the summary statistics; the fifth paragraph presents the regression analysis and 
the final paragraph concludes. 
 
5.1     The Italian situation: a brief overview 
Like the majority of the European countries, also Italy was severely hit by the financial crisis 
that started in the United States and spread throughout the world. At the end of 2008 the 
Italian economy suffered an initial contraction. The situation worsened in 2009. In this year in 
fact, the Gross Domestic Product suffered a loss of 5%, the public debt reached the level of 
115,1% of the GDP and the deficit increased by 2,6%
23
. Significant was also the collapse of 
the industrial sector. Also the unemployment increased significantly.  
The situation seemed to recover during 2010 but soon worsened again in 2011 from when the 
GDP decreased significantly. In 2011 Italy showed the strongest deterioration across all 
European countries, except Greece and Portugal. The decrease in GDP continued also for 
2012 and 2013 identifying Italy’s recession. 
The bad economic situation strongly affected the public finance and soon Italy entered into a 
sovereign debt crisis. From 2008 to 2010 the public debt rose from 103,6% to 119,0% of the 
GDP, reaching the amount of 1.843.015 millions of Euro
24
. An indicator of the worsening 
situation of the Italian debt was the spread between the German Bunds and the Italian Titoli 
                                                          
23
 Data from Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (2010). 
24
 Data taken from Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (2010). 
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del Tesoro which rose significantly since 2008. Starting from 100 basis points at the 
beginning of 2008 the spread rose up to 176 basis points in December 2009. The Italian 
sovereign debt crisis reached its worst period in summer 2011. From that point the spread rose 
up to 500 basis points in November 2011. 
The sovereign debt crisis of Italy had three important causes: 
 An already high level of public debt well before the financial crisis. 
 A limited GDP growth in the period before the crisis. 
 A poor credibility of the government. 
For what concerns the banking sector, Italian banks were hit by the crisis not really because of 
their holding of toxic products (which were of small dimensions) but because of the great 
amount of domestic debt holdings. 60% of the portfolio of the five major banks in Italy 
(Intesa Sanpaolo, Unicredit, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, Ubi Banca) 
consisted of Italian government bond, around 100 billion of government bonds
25
. These banks 
showed significant losses in the second week of July 2011: they lost around 8 billion of their 
capitalization
26
.  
Thus, the huge amount of holdings of public debt made Italian banks strongly sensitive to the 
worsening of the Italian sovereign debt crisis. 
Moreover, the situation of Italian banks was worsened by the high amount of non-performing 
loans that they owned. 
From 2012 to 2015 the banking sector continued to show bad conditions. A sign of 
improvement started at the end of 2015 which was mirrored by the decrease in the CDS 
spreads and in the Expected default frequency. The rescue of four banks in November did not 
affect significantly the stability of the banking sector and the establishment of Fondo Atlante 
in 2016 was welcomed by the market. 2016 showed a new worsening in the banking sector. 
This may reflect the increasingly uncertainty in growth prospects. The propensity to assume 
risk at the end of 2015 remained limited. This showed up in a limited credit lending to 
households and firms.  
Moreover, now the economy shows a gradual recovery. The debt to GDP ratio is expected to 
decrease by 0.3 percentage points in 2016
27
. 
At the beginning of 2016 the European Commission updated its estimates of sustainability 
indicators for the public finances. The new estimates confirm the sustainability of Italy’s 
public finance: the discounted present value of future budget revenues, net of that of future 
                                                          
25
 Data taken from Pavesi (2011). 
26
 Data taken from Anon. (2011). 
27
 Data taken from Banca d’Italia (2016). 
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expenditures, is more than sufficient to repay the present public debt. Furthermore, the 
Commission judges the risk of tensions in the sovereign debt securities market to be low in 
the short term, a conclusion supported by an analysis that considers the value of a broad set of 
macroeconomic and financial variables. The commission underscores, however, that the ratio 
of debt to GDP will stay high in the medium term (Banca d’Italia, 2016). 
 
5.2     Data 
In order to develop the empirical analysis we focus on the crisis that affected Italy from the 
end of 2007 to middle 2016.  
We consider as a measure of credit risk Credit Default Swaps spreads. We collected data on 
Italian sovereign and banks CDS spreads from Datastream. In particular, we collected data on 
daily sovereign and banks CDS spreads from 14 December 2007 to 19 April 2016.  
We found data on CDS spreads for different maturities: 6 months, 5 years and 30 years. We 
focus on these three maturities to get an overview on the short-run, medium-run and long-run. 
For what concerns Banks CDS we collected data on the six most important Italian banks: 
Banco Popolare, Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca Popolare di Milano, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 
Unione di Banche Italiane (UBI) and Unicredit.  
For the regression analysis we used a broad panel of aggregated data of all banks. Moreover, 
for the graphical analysis we also made a simple average of the data of these six banks. We 
also computed a banks average without introducing the data on Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 
This was done in order to avoid distortions deriving from the distress that the bank suffered, 
which was not due directly from the crisis.    
For what concerns the robustness analysis, we collected data on foreign sovereigns CDS in 
order to control for the credit risk of other countries. For our purposes we computed the 
simple average of the sovereign CDS of all the European countries available in Datastream.  
We also collected data on banks equity returns to control for banks fundamentals. 
 
5.3     Preliminary graphical analysis  
We started the analysis by doing a graphical representation of CDS spreads for the considered 
period. This was done in order to have a first insight into the presence of the link between 
sovereign and banks credit risks.  
We do the analysis for CDS with 6-month, 5-year and 30-year maturities.  
We started the analysis considering the spreads of  CDS with 6-month maturity. Results are 
shown in figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS spreads (6-month maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity for the period 
14/12/2007 to 19/04/2016. The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks CDS 
spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads of the 
six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without considering in 
the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. This was done because the bank 
suffered a significant distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
Figure 13 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity for the 
period from 14 December 2007 to 19 April 2016. The blue line represents the sovereign CDS 
spreads while the red line shows the average bank CDS spreads. We also introduce the green 
line which shows the average bank CDS spreads without Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS 
spreads. 
From the figure we can identify a co-movement of the CDS spreads of banks and sovereign. 
The lines representing the CDS spreads follow almost the same path. This is a sign of the 
presence of a link between sovereign credit risk and banks credit risk. 
The trend of the CDS spreads shows the start of the crisis in 2008. The level of the CDS 
spreads in fact, increases significantly in this period. Moreover, from the figure we can 
identify the recovery between 2009 and 2010 and the subsequent worsening of the crisis in 
2011. Between 2011 and 2012 the CDS spreads show a huge increase, which indicates a 
severe phase of the crisis. In this period in fact, as mentioned above, Italy faced the most 
severe peak of the sovereign debt crisis. 
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The high levels of CDS spreads were translated into corresponding high levels of credit risk. 
Italy in this period in fact, faced a downgrade in Standard and Poor’s ratings and its 
creditworthiness was worsening more and more.  
Moreover, from the figure we can identify a slow recovery starting in 2013. In 2014 the levels 
of CDS spreads are again low almost around the levels before the crisis. 
From 2015 sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS spreads start to diverge one from each 
other. This could be a sign of the effectiveness of the Banking Union in breaking the link. 
We said above that the crisis in Italy affected first the public finance still burdened with high 
levels of public debt. The worsening situation then moved to the banking sector through the 
massive holdings of public bonds that the banks held in their balance sheets. This succession 
of facts can be identified in figure 13. In fact, for the initial period, approximately till 2011, 
the sovereign CDS spreads show higher levels with respect to banks ones. This means that the 
sovereign was in a worse condition than the banks in that period. The only exception is in 
2009 when banks felt the negative effects of the banking crisis that was affecting the rest of 
the world. From around 2011 banks CDS spreads start to be higher than sovereign ones, and 
remain always above.  
We repeat the analysis for the 5-year maturity CDS spreads and the 30-year maturity CDS 
spreads. Results are shown in Annex 1 and Annex 2. From this additional analysis we found 
that also for the medium- and long-run there is evidence for a co-movement between 
sovereign and banks CDS spreads.   
Thus, for all three maturities we find evidence of a link between sovereign and banks credit 
risks also for Italy during the crisis. This is particularly strong in the post-bailouts period and 
seems to break after the establishment of the Banking Union. 
Following the work of Acharya et al. (2014), the next step was to understand if, once verified 
the presence of the link, this shows the three phases presented in chapter 2. This means that 
we verify whether also for Italy the presence of the link between sovereign and banks credit 
risks started with the bailouts and worsened in the following period. In addition, we verified 
whether the establishment of the Banking Union breaks this link.  
Even if in Italy there were no bailouts we consider this period in order to verify if Italian 
sovereign and banks were affected by the events that occurred in Europe.  
In order to conduct the graphical analysis we divided our data into four different period:                   
a pre-bailout period from 14 December 2007 to 25 September 2008, a bailout period from             
26 September 2008 to 30 October 2008, a post-bailout period from 31 October 2008 to  
1 January 2013 and a Banking Union period from 1 January 2015 to 19 April 2016. We 
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stopped the post-bailout period at the beginning of 2013 in order to not capture the effect of 
the Banking Union and we started the last period in 2015 to be sure that the effects of the 
Banking Union are already present since the SSM is already entered into force.   
We started by analyzing the period before the bailouts. This is shown in figure 14. 
Figure 14: CDS spreads in the pre-bailout period (6-month maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity for the pre-bailout 
period (14/12/2007-25/09/2008). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks 
CDS spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads 
of the six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without 
considering in the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. This was done 
because the bank suffered a significant distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
Figure 14 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity for the pre-
bailout period (14/12/2007-25/09/2008). The spreads are still low, which means that the credit 
risks of banks and sovereign are so far not a concern. 
Moreover, before the bailout we can see that the two lines, sovereign and banks ones, follow 
different patterns. In particular, we can see that banks CDS spreads show peaks that sovereign 
CDS spreads do not show. This supports the idea that before the bailouts there is no link 
between sovereign and bank credit risks.  
We went on with the analysis of the bailout period. The results are shown in figure 15. The 
figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity for the bailout 
period.  
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Figure 15: CDS spreads in the bailout period (6-month maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity for the bailout period.          
The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks CDS spreads are represented by 
the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six major Italian banks. 
The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without considering in the computation of the 
average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. This was done because the bank suffered a significant 
distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
As can be seen in figure 15, the lines start to converge. This could be an indication of the start 
of the link in this period. The risk shifting between sovereign and banks credit risks is not 
clear for the 6-month maturity CDS. This could be due to the fact that actually Italy does not 
carry out bailouts.  
We continued with the analysis of the post-bailout period. Results are shown in figure 16. The 
figure shows spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity, for the post-bailout 
period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013).  
The figure gives strong support to the hypothesis that after the bailouts sovereign and banks 
credit risks start to co-move. In fact, the line representing sovereign CDS spreads and banks 
CDS spreads follow the same patterns.  
Moreover, we can identify a huge peak in spreads in the period 2011-2012, corresponding to 
the most severe period in the Italian crisis. Results are common across all maturities. 
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Figure 16: CDS spreads in the post-bailout period (6-month maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity, for the post-bailout 
period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks 
CDS spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads 
of the six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without 
considering in the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. This was done 
because the bank suffered a significant distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
Finally, we analyzed the period after the establishment of the first pillar of the Banking Union 
in figure 17. The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month 
maturity for the Banking Union period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016).  
We can notice that the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS start to diverge. Banks CDS are 
higher than sovereigns one. This could mean that with the establishment of the SSM the link 
starts to break.  
We repeat the analysis of each period also for 5-year maturity CDS and 30-year maturity 
CDS. Results are presented in annex 1 and annex 2.  
Also for these two maturities, findings support the hypothesis that the link starts in the period 
of the bailouts and becomes stronger in the post-bailout period. Moreover, during the Banking 
Union the link seems to become weaker and to break.   
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Figure 17: CDS spreads in the Banking Union period (6-month maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month maturity for the Banking Union 
period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks 
CDS spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads 
of the six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without 
considering in the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. This was done 
because the bank suffered a significant distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
After the graphical analysis of the trend of the CDS spreads we move to a graphical analysis 
of the changes in CDS spreads during the four different phases mentioned above.  
We analyzed the changes in CDS spreads from the beginning to the end of each phase. We 
developed the analysis for sovereign CDS spreads and average bank CDS spreads and also in 
this case we consider two different computations of the average, with and without Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena. 
We present the analysis for CDS with 6-month, 5-year and 30-year maturities. 
We started with the analysis of the changes in CDS spreads for the pre-bailout phase, from  
14 December 2007 to 25 September 2008. Figure 18 shows the results. The red and the green 
bars represent the changes in banks CDS spreads during the pre-bailout period while the blue 
bars represent the changes in CDS sovereign spreads. 
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 Figure 18: Changes in spreads of CDS in the pre-bailout period 
 
The figure shows the changes in spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month, 5-year and 30-year 
maturities for the pre-bailout period (14/12/2007-25/09/2008). The changes in CDS spreads are calculated 
as the difference in spreads from the beginning to the end of each phase. For the average bank CDS we 
have two different measures. One is given by the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six major 
Italian banks, including Monte dei Paschi di Siena, represented by the red bars. The second, represented 
by the green bars, is given by the simple average of banks CDS spreads without including Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena CDS in the computation. This was done because the bank suffered a significant distress 
due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
We can notice that the changes in banks CDS spreads during the pre-bailout period are greater 
than the changes in sovereign CDS spreads. This supports the idea that sovereign credit risk 
and banks credit risk move independently in this initial phase. 
However, for the CDS with 5-year maturity we cannot get the same conclusion. In fact, the 
changes in sovereign CDS spreads are similar to those of banks CDS spreads. 
The analysis goes on focusing on the changes in CDS spreads for the bailout phase (from              
26 September 2008 to 30 October 2008). This is shown in Figure 19.  
The results support the hypothesis that with the bailouts there is a risk shifting from banks to 
sovereign. Figure 19, in fact, shows that during the bailout period sovereign CDS spreads face 
an increase while banks CDS decrease. This mirrors the opposite movements of sovereign and 
banks credit risks. 
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Figure 20: Changes in spreads of CDS in the bailout period 
 
The figure shows the changes in spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month, 5-year and 30-year 
maturities for the bailout period (26/09/2008-30/10/2008). The changes in CDS spreads are calculated as 
the difference in spreads from the beginning to the end of each phase. For the average bank CDS we have 
two different measures. One is given by the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six major Italian 
banks, including Monte dei Paschi di Siena, represented by the red bars. The second, represented by the 
green bars, is given by the simple average of banks CDS spreads without including Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena CDS in the computation. This was done because the bank suffered a significant distress due to 
reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
We continued analyzing the changes in CDS spreads for the post-bailout phase. The results 
are shown in figure 20.  
Sovereign CDS spreads show similar changes to those of banks CDS spreads. This supports 
the hypothesis that after the bailouts banks CDS spreads start again to increase and reach the 
level of sovereign CDS spreads.  
Moreover, the two risks exhibit similar changes. This supports the hypothesis that the 
sovereign credit risk affects significantly banks credit risk.  
The results are consistent for all three different maturities. 
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Figure 21: Changes in spreads of CDS in the post-bailout period 
 
The figure shows the changes in spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month, 5-year and 30-year 
maturities for the post-bailout period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013). The changes in CDS spreads are 
calculated as the difference in spreads from the beginning to the end of each phase. For the average bank 
CDS we have two different measures. One is given by the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six 
major Italian banks, including Monte dei Paschi di Siena, represented by the red bars. The second, 
represented by the green bars, is given by the simple average of banks CDS spreads without including 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS in the computation. This was done because the bank suffered a significant 
distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
Finally, we analyze the changes in CDS spreads for the Banking Union phase. The results are 
shown in figure 21.  
We can notice that banks CDS face greater changes in spreads with respect to sovereign CDS 
spreads. This supports the hypothesis that sovereign credit risk and banks credit risk move 
independently. Therefore, sovereign credit risk no longer affects banks credit risk.  
This actually could be an indication of the fact that the establishment of the Banking Union 
breaks the link.    
Conclusion are analogous for all three maturities. 
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Figure 21: Changes in spreads of CDS in the Banking Union period 
 
The figure shows the changes in spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 6-month, 5-year and 30-year 
maturities for the Banking Union period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016). The changes in CDS spreads are 
calculated as the difference in spreads from the beginning to the end of each phase. For the average bank 
CDS we have two different measures. One is given by the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six 
major Italian banks, including Monte dei Paschi di Siena, represented by the red bars. The second, 
represented by the green bars, is given by the simple average of banks CDS spreads without including 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS in the computation. This was done because the bank suffered a significant 
distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
 
Thus, the analysis of the changes in CDS spreads gives support to the hypothesis that in the 
bailout period we have a risk shifting from banks to sovereign, in the post-bailout period the 
sovereign and the banks credit risk are linked, and in the Banking Union period the link 
becomes weaker and breaks. Not clear is the behavior of credit risk in the pre-bailout period 
since the behavior of CDS with 5-year maturity does not really support our hypothesis of no 
link in this initial phase. 
 
5.4     Summary statistics 
After the graphical analysis we move to analyze the data. We first compute summary statistics 
for the periods before, during, and after the bailouts and the Banking Union period for 
sovereign CDS spreads (Sovereign CDS), average bank CDS spreads (Banks CDS), the 
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average equity returns (Bank Equity Return) and the average spreads of foreign sovereigns 
CDS (Foreign CDS).  
Results are shown in figure 22.  
Figure 22: Summary statistics 
 
The table provides summary statistics for the periods before, during, and after the bailouts and the 
Banking Union period. Sovereign CDS includes the sovereign CDS spreads, Banks CDS includes the 
average bank CDS spreads, Bank Equity Return is the average bank equity return and Foreign CDS 
includes the average spreads of foreign sovereigns CDS spreads. Sovereign CDS, Banks CDS, 
Foreign CDS are expressed in basis points (bp).  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
We have 9502 observations for each variable. In particular, 816 observations for the  
pre-bailout period, 125 for the bailout period, 6527 for the post-bailout and 2034 for the 
Banking Union period.  
Analyzing the results, we can see that in the pre-bailout phase the sovereign CDS and the 
average bank ones are low at 12 basis points and 50 basis points, respectively. In the bailout 
phase we see an important increase in the sovereign CDS spreads which move to 44,82 basis 
points, while average bank CDS spreads increase to 76,25 basis points. We can see that 
sovereign CDS spreads increase fourfold while banks increase not so significantly as 
sovereign ones.  
Obs. Mean Std. Dev
5th 
percentile
50th 
percentile
95th 
percentile
Pre-bailout (14/12/2007 to 
25/09/2008)
Sovereign CDS (bp) 816 12,186 4,28 4,25 12,75 18,5
Banks CDS (bp) 816 50,650 21,63 26,5 45,66 99
Bank Equity Return 816 4% 1,98% 3,51% 3,51% 11,93%
Foreign CDS (bp) 816 24,03 9,649 10,562 23,33 40,715
Bailout (01/06/2008 to 
30/10/2008)
Sovereign CDS (bp) 125 44,82 27,327 12,25 43 99
Bank CDS (bp) 125 76,25 20 48,54 73 110
Bank Equity Return 125 3,51% 0 3,51% 3,51% 3,51%
Foreign CDS (bp) 125 209,52 99,46 64,11 219,02 344,48
Post-bailout (31/10/2008 to 
01/01/2013)
Sovereign CDS (bp) 6527 131,861 116,865 17,21 97,372 409,541
Bank CDS (bp) 6527 222,99 188,8 40 142 624,31
Bank Equity Return 6527 -5,43% 9,64% -20,22% 2,94% 3,06%
Foreign CDS (bp) 6527 687,084 815,268 90,581 197,226 2226,838
Banking Union (01/01/2015 to 
19/04/2016)
Sovereign CDS (bp) 2034 26,826 7,662 14,62 27,52 39,79
Bank CDS (bp) 2034 104,067 120,47 14,88 63,5 221,45
Bank Equity Return 2034 4,51% 0% 4,51% 4,51% 4,51%
Foreign CDS (bp) 2034 2053,094 6,024 2043,652 2053,268 2066,044
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In the post-bailout phase we see a huge increase in the CDS spreads levels of both average 
bank and sovereign, which move, respectively, to around 223 basis points and to 132 basis 
points. This huge increase in CDS spreads indicates the emergence of important sovereign 
and bank credit risks in Italy.  
Finally, in the last phase, we see a gradual decrease in both sovereign and average bank CDS 
spreads which move to 27 basis points and 104 basis points, respectively.    
We notice that the spreads of sovereign CDS faced a greater reduction in their levels. Also 
banks CDS decrease in this period.  
From the summary statistics we can see that from the start of the crisis CDS spreads, both 
sovereign and banks ones, increased significantly. This indicates the worsening of the credit 
risk of both banks and sovereign during the crisis. In the Banking Union period the spreads 
decreased again. 
Foreign CDS show an increase since the initial phase. In particular, in the Banking Union 
phase there are significantly high values. These mirrors the high risk of Greece. 
Banks average equity returns show a significant decrease since the start of the crisis. They 
recover only in the Banking Union period. 
 
5.5     Regression analysis 
We now undertake the regression analysis in order to test our preliminary findings in the 
graphical analysis. 
Following Acharya et al. (2014), we estimate all regressions at the daily level. This permits to 
have a larger dataset.   
To test the presence of the link between sovereign credit risk and banks credit risk, we verify 
whether changes in sovereign credit risk affects significantly banks credit risk. We do this by 
testing if a variation in the daily change in the logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads has a 
significant impact on the daily change in the logarithm of bank CDS spreads. We transformed 
our data in logarithms in order to reduce the impact of outliers.    
Furthermore, following Acharya et al. (2014) we add three controls to get rid of some factors 
that can create a link between sovereign and banks credit risks even in absence of a direct 
feedback mechanism.  
We first include time fixed effects to capture all the changes in macroeconomics fundamentals 
(like employment, economic growth) that affect both banks and sovereign credit risks and do 
not vary over time. 
66 
 
We then consider that banks hold also bond of foreign sovereigns, thus, the worsening in the 
credit risk of foreign sovereigns could affect the credit risk of the bank. Following the work of 
Acharya et al. (2014), we control for the risk of foreign sovereigns debt exposure by using the 
spreads of foreign sovereigns CDS.  
Finally, we consider the fact that also a reduction in profitability affects negatively the credit 
risk of a banks. Controlling for banks’ own equity returns will control for the impact of any 
country-level shocks which could affect the activity of the bank and eliminate sovereign CDS 
as an explanatory variable (Acharya et al., 2014).  
Thus, following Acharya et al. (2014), our regression function is: 
Δlog(Bank CDSit) = αi + δt + β1 Δlog(Sovereign CDSt) + β2 Δlog(Foreign CDSt) + 
+ β3 Bank Equity Returnit + εit 
where our dependent variable, Δlog(Bank CDSit), is the change in the natural logarithm of the 
CDS spreads of banks i from day t to day t+1 and the dependent variable, Δlog(Sovereign 
CDSt), is the change in the logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads from day t to day t+1. The 
parameter of interest β1 shows the relationship between daily change in the logarithm of 
sovereign CDS spreads and daily change in the logarithm of banks CDS spreads. 
Δlog(Foreign CDSt) is the control for the risk of foreign counterparties and β2 is its 
coefficient. β2 is also of independent interest since it gives a measure of sensitivity of banks 
credit risk with respect to foreign sovereigns credit risk changes. Bank Equity Returnit is the 
control for the bank’ own equity and β3 is its coefficient, finally αi is the intercept, δi captures 
the time fixed effect and εit is the error term.  
We present the analysis on CDS with 6-month and 30-year maturities, since they show the 
greatest evidence in the results. Result for regressions on data on CDS with 5-year maturity 
are presented in annex 1.  
We present separated results for the different four phases mentioned above. For the  
pre-bailout, post-bailout, and Banking Union periods we have two specifications: one shows 
the results of the regression controlling for the foreign sovereigns credit risk, the other 
includes also the banks equity returns control. For the bailout phase we have only the 
specification with the introduction of the foreign sovereigns credit risk. We must drop the 
other specification because of lack of data. 
In all specification we control for time fixed effects. 
To support the hypothesis that there is a link between sovereign and banks credit risks that 
starts after the bailouts we should find no significant effect of our independent variable, 
Δlog(SovereignCDSt), on the dependent one, Δlog (Banks CDSit), in the pre-bailout phase 
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while a significant effect in the post-bailout phase. Moreover, to test the hypothesis that the 
Banking Union helps to break the link we should find no significant effect of 
Δlog(SovereignCDSt) on Δlog(Banks CDSit) in the Banking Union phase. 
Figure 23 shows the results on aggregate data on CDS with 6-month maturity
28
. 
Figure 24: Regressions results (CDS with 6-month maturity) 
 
The figure shows the results of the regression of Δlog(Banks CDSit) on Δlog(Sovereign CDSt). For these 
regression were used aggregate data on spreads of CDS with 6-month maturity. Columns (1), and (2) 
cover the pre-bailout period (14/12/2007-25/09/2008). Column (3) covers the bailout period (26/09/2008-
30/10/2008). Columns (4) and (5) cover the post-bailout period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013). Columns (6) 
and (7) cover the Banking Union period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016). Δlog(Sovereign CDSt) includes the 
daily change in the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads, Δlog(Banks CDSit) includes the daily 
change in the natural logarithm of banks CDS spreads, Bank Equity Returnit represents banks equity 
returns and Δlog(Foreign CDSt) includes the daily change in the natural logarithm of average spreads of 
foreign sovereigns CDS spreads. Δlog(Sovereign CDSt), Δlog(Banks CDSit) and Δlog(Foreign CDSt) are 
expressed in basis points (bp). Specifications (1), (3), (4) and (6) include the control variable variables 
Δlog(Foreign CDSt). Specifications (2), (5) and (7) include both control variables Δlog(Foreign CDSt) 
and Banks Equity Returnit. In all specification we control for time fixed effects. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis. ** indicates statistical significance at a 5% level.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
We started by analyzing the pre-bailout period. Differently from what expected, there is 
evidence of a relation between sovereign and banks credit risks also before the bailouts for the 
Italian context. In fact, the coefficient β is statistically significant and a variation of 1 basis 
point in the daily change in the logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads leads to a 0,16 basis point 
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 Standard deviations are in parenthesis. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
Bailout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δlog(SovereignCDS)
0,161** 
(0,0227)
0,1608** 
(0,0226)
0,1888** 
(0,0721)
0,1097** 
(0,0063)
0,1096** 
(0,0063)
0,2195** 
(0,0157)
0,2194** 
(0,016)
Δlog(Foreign CDS)
0,17** 
(0,0475)
0,1689** 
(0,0474)
0,1244 
(0,1298)
0,5204** 
(0,0198)
0,5205** 
(0,02)
7,2528 
(5,1083)
7,2518 
(5,108)
Bank Equity Return
-0,011** 
(0,0052)
-0,0313** 
(0,0701)
-0,0539** 
(0,0045)
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 816 816 125 6527 6527 2034 2034
Banks 4 4 5 6 6 6 6
R
2 0,0851 0,0815 0,1293 0,2096 0,21 0,1263 0,3238
Δlog(Banks CDS)
Pre-Bailout Post-Bailout Banking Union
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increase in the daily change in logarithm of banks CDS spreads. Our parameter of interest 
remains statistically significant also after the introduction of the control. These results confirm 
that for Italy sovereign credit risk actually affects banks credit risk and this well before the 
bailouts, contrary to what we supposed. We have to remember that Italy had a very high level 
of public debt well before the start of the crisis and part of the debt was held by the financial 
sector.  
Thus, one important results is that the bailouts were not the trigger factor of the link in the 
case of Italy. This is consistent with the results that we found in the bailout period. In fact, the 
independent variable remains significant and, instead of decreasing, it increases. This is 
coherent with the fact that Italy did not carry out bailouts in this period.  
For what concerns the Δlog(Foreign CDSt) variable, it is statistically significant in this first 
phase, while it loses significance in the bailout period. This could be an indication of the fact 
that the foreign States that carried out bailouts really took the risk of banks in these period. 
In column (2) we add the banks equity returns as control. Δlog(Sovereign CDSt) remains 
statistically significant. Moreover, the equity return control is statistically significant. This 
means that changes in profitability affects the credit risk of banks, in particular an increase in 
profitability reduces the credit risks of banks. 
We then move to the post-bailout phase. Column (4) and (5) shows the results of the 
regressions. We can see that the coefficient of interest is, as expected, statistically significant 
and positive. In particular, when sovereign CDS spreads rise also banks CDS spreads rise: for 
an increase of 1 basis point in the daily change in logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads there is 
a 0,11 basis point increase in daily change in logarithm of banks CDS spreads. The results are 
robust to the inclusion of the controls.  
Δlog(Foreign CDSt) is statistically significant. The link to foreign sovereigns risk is, thus, 
again present in the post bailout phase.  
The equity return still affects the credit risk of banks. 
Finally, we analyze the Banking Union phase. Column (6) and (7) shows the results. 
Differently from what expected the coefficient of Δlog(Sovereign CDSit) is statistically 
significant, also after the inclusion of the controls. This means that the link between the two 
credit risks is still present.  
Interesting to note is the fact that Δlog(Foreign CDSt) is no longer statistically significant. 
This could mean that the Banking Union starts to affect the foreign exposures.  
More interesting are the results of the regressions on 30-year maturity CDS.  
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Results are shown in figure 24
29
. 
Figure 24: Regression results (CDS with 30-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the results of the regression of Δlog(Banks CDSit) on Δlog(Sovereign CDSt). For these 
regression were used aggregate data on spreads of CDS with 30-year maturity. Columns (1), and (2) 
cover the pre-bailout period (14/12/2007-25/09/2008). Column (3) covers the bailout period (26/09/2008-
30/10/2008). Columns (4) and (5) cover the post-bailout period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013). Columns (6) 
and (7) cover the Banking Union period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016). Δlog(Sovereign CDSt) includes the 
daily change in the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads, Δlog(Banks CDSit) includes the daily 
change in the natural logarithm of banks CDS spreads, Bank Equity Returnit represents banks equity 
returns and Δlog(Foreign CDSt) includes the daily change in the natural logarithm of average spreads of 
foreign sovereigns CDS spreads. Δlog(Sovereign CDSt), Δlog(Banks CDSit) and Δlog(Foreign CDSt) are 
expressed in basis points (bp). Specifications (1), (3), (4) and (6) include the control variable 
Δlog(Foreign CDSt). Specifications (2), (5) and (7) include both control variables Δlog(Foreign CDSt) 
and Banks Equity Returnit. In all specification we control for time fixed effects. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis. ** indicates statistical significance at a 5% level.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
From figure 24 we get results that support our hypothesis. Although, the link is still present 
we can see that it weakens substantially in the Banking Union phase. The parameter of 
interest drops from 0,95 in the pre-bailout period to 0,42 in the Banking Union period. This 
indicates that in the long-run the Banking Union has a positive effect on the link between 
sovereign and banks credit risks.  
Also for CDS with 30-year maturity Δlog(Foreign CDSt) is significant both in the pre-bailout 
and in the post-bailout period. The equity returns affect banks credit risk in each period.   
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 Standard deviations are in parenthesis. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
Bailout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δlog(SovereignCDS) 0,9506** 
(0,0796)
0,9566** 
(0,0796)
0,359** 
(0,07254)
0,276** 
(0,0088)
0,2757** 
(0,0089)
0,4214** 
(0,0276)
0,4212** 
(0,027)
Δlog(Foreign CDS) 0,1151** 
(0,0321)
0,115** 
(0,0322)
0,0698 
(0,0738)
0,1936** 
(0,0127)
0,1946** 
(0,0126)
2,1304 
(2,228)
2,14          
( 2,281)
Bank Equity Return -0,0137** 
(0,0031)
0,0479** 
(0,0045)
-0,0973** 
(0,021)
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 816 816 125 6527 6527 2034 2034
Banks 4 4 5 6 6 6 6
R
2
0,1792 0,18 0,2805 0,2465 0,2467 0,2047 0,2777
Banking UnionPre-Bailout Post-Bailout
Δlog(Banks CDS)
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5.6     Results 
In the initial graphical analysis we found evidence for the presence of a link between 
sovereign credit risk and banks credit risk. In fact the spreads of sovereign and average bank 
CDS move together. This results are robust for various CDS maturities we considered. 
Analyzing graphically each period separately we found support for our hypothesis: the 
bailouts triggered a relationship between sovereign and banks credit risks that should be 
broken after the establishment of the Banking Union. In particular, from the graphical analysis 
we found that in the pre-bailout phase sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS spreads move 
differently. We take it as an indication of no link in this phase. In the post-bailout phase we 
found evidence for the link. The CDS spreads in fact move together. 
Moreover, focusing on the period after the establishment of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, we found evidence for the breaking of the link in the analysis of the average 
bank. The CDS spreads in fact diverge. 
In the regression analysis we found support for our hypothesis on the presence of the link 
between sovereign and banks credit risks. The parameter of interest is statistically significant, 
which means that sovereign credit risk affects significantly banks credit risk. These results are 
valid also after the inclusion of controls such as time fixed effects, foreign sovereigns 
exposures risk and the profitability of banks. 
Contrary to what we expected, in the pre-bailout period there is still the link between the two 
credit risks. This could have different reasons. This could be due to the lack of data since our 
collection starts only at 14 December 2007. Moreover, the burden of the Italian public debt 
was already significant well before the start of the crisis.  
However, more significant is the fact that, coherently with the fact that Italy did not carry out 
bailouts, in the bailout period we do not find evidence for a risk shift between sovereign and 
banks. 
Finally, for what concerns the Banking Union period we found that the link is still present. In 
particular, in the short term there are no effects of the establishment of the Banking Union on 
the link between sovereign and banks credit risks. This could be due to the fact that the 
Banking Union is not fully completed. Moreover, one has to bear in mind that Italy is still 
facing problems in the banking sector, ranging from Banca Popolare di Vicenza to Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena. This could affect the effectiveness of the Banking Union in the short term. 
Different are the results for the long-run. We found in fact that the Banking Union affects 
positively the link by weakening it. 
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Interesting to note that the effects of the Banking Union are more present for foreign 
sovereigns credit risk. In the Banking Union in fact foreign sovereigns credit risk does no 
longer affect banks credit risk. 
To conclude, we found evidence that Italian sovereign credit risk affects Italian banks credit 
risk. moreover, the Banking Union seems to weaken this link only in the long term. 
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Conclusions 
 
The events of the crisis started in 2008 worsen the financial stability of the banking sectors in 
the world. Several countries, especially in Europe, were forced to carry out bailouts in order 
to restore financial stability. 
As shown by many authors, these bailouts were the trigger factor of the link between 
sovereign and banks credit risks. In fact, just after the bailouts the two credit risks showed to 
be linked, in particular an increase in sovereign credit risk was mirrored by an analogous 
decrease in banks credit risk. This was due to a risk shifting from banks to sovereign. 
However, after this initial risk shifting banks credit risks increased again and reached the 
levels of sovereign credit risk. From that moment sovereign credit risk affected negatively 
banks credit risk. 
All this happened because the bailouts were of significant size and, thus, impacted severely on 
the public debt. The more and more increasing levels of public debt deteriorated the 
creditworthiness of the sovereign. As a consequence the credit risk of the sovereign increased 
significantly. 
Moreover, local banks hold significant amounts of sovereign debt in their balance sheet. 
Through this holding the deterioration of sovereign credit risk was transmitted to banks credit 
risk. The bad situation became even worse since the relation between sovereign and banks 
translated into a vicious cycle. 
The European Union decided to intervene in order to break this link. In 2012, in fact, the EU 
decided to establish the Banking Union, which through its three pillars, should avoid further 
interventions of the States in restoring the stability of the financial sector. This is done by, 
first, avoiding instability in the financial sector and, second, in case of financial instability by 
referring to  shareholders and creditors to rescue the failing financial institution. 
The first step in breaking the link was the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
which permitted to reach uniformity in the supervision of European financial institutions. This 
was an important step since the differences across countries were one of the reasons that 
worsened the financial crisis. This first pillar is responsible to make financial institutions 
more stable and resilient in order to avoid future crises. 
The second step was the establishment of the Single Resolution Mechanism. It was the natural 
complement of the Single Supervisory Mechanism since a common supervision could not 
work with a national resolution. The effectiveness of the Single Resolution Mechanism in 
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breaking the link is due to the fact that it avoids the intervention of the State in the rescue of 
failing financial institutions.  
The next step in completing the Banking Union, towards which the EU has to work, is the 
establishment of a common insurance scheme. This is necessary in order to avoid bank runs 
and, thus, making financial institutions more stable. The establishment of a common deposit 
insurance scheme is necessary because, without it, the effects of national shocks are not yet 
avoided. 
We tested the presence of the link between banks and sovereign and the effectiveness of the 
Banking Union in breaking it by using data on Italian sovereign and Italian banks CDS. 
We found that the link between sovereign and banks credit risks is present also in Italy. 
Moreover, we found that the link is present also in the pre-bailout period. This could be due to 
the fact that Italy had already a high level of debt well before the start of the financial crisis 
and the GDP growth in those year was very low. Moreover, a high amount of the public debt 
was held by financial institutions.  
For what concerns the risk shifting from banks to sovereign during the bailout period we did 
not find clear evidence. This is due to the fact that Italy did not carry out bailouts. This is 
consistent also with the fact that the link does not start with the bailout while well before it. 
For what concerns the effectiveness of the Banking Union, we found evidence for the fact that 
in the short term the Banking Union has no effect on the link between Italian banks and Italian 
sovereign. The effects are evident only in the medium- and long-run. This could be due to the 
fact that it is no long time ago that the Banking Union was made into force and the effects are 
not clear. Moreover, it is not fully completed. This means that also the establishment of the 
third pillar must be done in a short time. 
We can conclude that the European Union is working in the right way in order to stabilize the 
financial markets. The establishment of the Banking Union is the right measure, although 
several things has to be done, in particular the establishment of the third pillar.  
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Annex 1 
Analysis of 5-year maturity CDS 
 
Figure A.1.1 shows the spreads of 5-year maturity CDS. 
 Figure A.1.1: Sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS spreads (5-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the period 14/12/2007 
to 19/04/2016. The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks CDS spreads are 
represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six major 
Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without considering in the 
computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. This was done because the bank 
suffered a significant distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
As can be seen in the figure, sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS spreads move together. 
This indicates that also in the medium-run case there is a relation between the credit risk of 
sovereign and the credit risk of banks. Also in figure A.1.1 we add the average bank CDS 
spreads computed without Monte dei Paschi di Siena.  
From the figure we identify the development of the crisis in Italy: the start in 2008 with the 
increase in CDS spreads, the first recovery in 2010 and the severe worsening of the crisis in 
2011 that continued for the following years. 2014 shows a significant reduction in CDS 
spreads and in 2015 sovereign and banks CDS start to diverge. 
We move to the analysis for each period. Figure A.1.2 shows the spreads of sovereign and 
banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the pre-bailout period (14/12/2007 -25/09/2008).  
76 
 
We can notice that before the bailout sovereign CDS and banks ones follow different patterns. 
This supports the idea that before the bailouts there is no link between sovereign and bank 
credit risks.  
Figure A.1.2: CDS spreads in the pre-bailout period (5-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the pre-bailout period 
(14/12/2007-25/09/2008). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks CDS 
spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads of the 
six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without considering in 
the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. Source: author’s own evaluation. 
Figure A.1.3 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the 
bailout period.  
Figure A.1.3: CDS spreads in the bailout period (5-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the bailout period. 
The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks CDS spreads are represented by 
the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six major Italian banks. 
The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without considering in the computation of the 
average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. Source: author’s own evaluation. 
77 
 
As can be seen in figure A.1.3, the lines start to converge. This supports the hypothesis of the 
start of the link in this period. Moreover, the line of the sovereign CDS at some point goes 
above the line of banks CDS spreads. This could indicate that there is a risk shifting from 
banks to sovereign. This was not clear with CDS with 6-month maturity. 
Figure A.1.4: CDS spreads in the post-bailout period (5-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity, for the post-bailout 
period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks 
CDS spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads 
of the six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without 
considering in the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. Source: author’s 
own evaluation.  
Figure A.1.4 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the 
post-bailout period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013).  
The figure supports the hypothesis that after the bailouts sovereign and banks credit risks start 
to co-move. In fact, the line representing sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS spreads 
follow the same patterns.  
Moreover, we can identify a significant increase in CDS spreads in the period between 2011 
and 2012 when the crisis reached the most acute phase. 
Figure A.1.5 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the 
Banking Union period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016).  
From the figure we can notice that the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS start to diverge. 
This could indicate that the Banking Union breaks the link between sovereign and banks 
credit risks. 
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Figure A.1.5: CDS spreads in the Banking Union period (5-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the Banking Union 
period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks 
CDS spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads 
of the six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without 
considering in the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. 
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
We move to the regression analysis. Figure A.1.6 shows the results. 
We found that in the medium-run the link between sovereign and banks credit risks is still 
present. In fact, our independent variable is statistically significant. This is verified also after 
the inclusion of the controls.  
For what concerns the Banking Union period we found that the link is still present but it has 
become weaker. The parameter of interest in fact drops from 0,6 to 0,3.  
This means that the establishment of the Banking Union is thought to be effective in 
weakening the link in the medium-term. 
There is no evidence of the risk shifting from banks to sovereign in the bailout period, 
however the effect of sovereign credit risk on banks credit risk has become weaker.  
In the post-bailout period the effect of sovereign credit risk on banks credit risk becomes 
again stronger. 
For what concerns the foreign sovereigns credit risk, the control variable is significant only in 
the pre-bailout and in the post-bailout period.  
The equity returns variable is always significant. 
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Figure A.1.6: Regressions results (CDS with 5-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the results of the regression of Δlog(Banks CDSit) on Δlog(Sovereign CDSt). For these 
regression were used aggregate data on spreads of CDS with 5-year maturity. Columns (1), and (2) cover 
the pre-bailout period (14/12/2007-25/09/2008). Column (3) covers the bailout period (26/09/2008-
30/10/2008). Columns (4) and (5) cover the post-bailout period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013). Columns (6) 
and (7) cover the Banking Union period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016). Δlog(Sovereign CDSt) includes the 
daily change in the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS spreads, Δlog(Banks CDSit) includes the daily 
change in the natural logarithm of banks CDS spreads, Bank Equity Returnit represents banks equity 
returns and Δlog(Foreign CDSt) includes the daily change in the natural logarithm of average spreads of 
foreign sovereigns CDS spreads. Δlog(Sovereign CDSt), Δlog(Banks CDSit) and Δlog(Foreign CDSt) are 
expressed in basis points (bp). Specifications (1), (3), (4) and (6) include the control variable 
Δlog(Foreign CDSt.)Specifications (2), (5) and (7) include both control variables Δlog(Foreign CDSt) and 
Banks Equity Returnit. In all specification we control for time fixed effects. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis. ** indicates statistical significance at a 5% level.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bailout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δlog(SovereignCDS)
0,6012** 
(0,0611)
0,6013** 
(0,0611)
0,3137** 
(0,0784)
0,3051** 
(0,0205)
0,3049** 
(0,0205)
0,325** 
(0,0860)
0,3254** 
(0,0861)
Δlog(Foreign CDS)
0,1921** 
(0,0344)
0,1921** 
(0,04)
0,1037 
(0,0979)
0,1556** 
(0,0358)
0,156** 
(0,0358)
4,115 
(2,113)
4,1143 
(2,1133)
Bank Equity Return
-0,019** 
(0,00347)
-0,0303** 
(0,0084)
-0,0968** 
(0,0193)
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 816 816 125 6527 6527 2034 2034
Banks 4 4 5 6 6 6 6
R
2 0,1676 0,17 0,2519 0,0765 0,111 0,174 0,18
Pre-Bailout Post-Bailout
Δlog(Banks CDS)
Banking Union
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Annex 2 
Analysis of 30-year maturity CDS 
 
Figure A.2.1 shows the spreads of 30-year maturity CDS. 
 Figure A.2.1: Sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS spreads (30-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 30-year for the period 14/12/2007 to 
19/04/2016. The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks CDS spreads are 
represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six major 
Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without considering in the 
computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. This was done because the bank 
suffered a significant distress due to reason well beyond the financial crisis.  
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
As can be seen in the figure, also in the long-term sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS 
spreads move together. This supports the hypothesis that there is a relation between the credit 
risk of sovereign and the credit risk of banks. Also in figure A.2.1 we add the average bank 
CDS spreads computed without Monte dei Paschi di Siena.  
From the figure we identify the development of the crisis in Italy: the start in 2008 with the 
increase in CDS spreads, the first recovery in 2010 and the severe worsening of the crisis in 
2011 that continued for the following years. 2014 shows a significant reduction of CDS 
spreads and in 2015 the sovereign and the banks CDS start to diverge. 
We move to the analysis for each period. Figure A.2.2 shows the spreads of sovereign and 
banks CDS with 30-year maturity for the pre-bailout period (14/12/2007-25/09/2008).  
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Figure A.2.2: CDS spreads in the pre-bailout period (30-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 30-year maturity for the pre-bailout 
period (14/12/2007-25/09/2008). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks 
CDS spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads 
of the six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without 
considering in the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. Source: author’s 
own evaluation. 
From figure A.2.2 we can see that sovereign CDS and banks CDS follow different patterns. 
This supports the idea that before the bailouts there is no link between sovereign and bank 
credit risk.  
Figure A.2.3: CDS spreads in the bailout period (30-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the bailout period. 
The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks CDS spreads are represented by 
the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads of the six major Italian banks. 
The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without considering in the computation of the 
average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. Source: author’s own evaluation. 
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Figure A.2.3 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 30-year maturity for the 
bailout period. Sovereign CDS and banks CDS start to converge. This could indicate the start 
of the link in this period.  
Moreover, the line of the sovereign CDS at some point goes above the line of banks CDS 
spreads. This could indicate that there is a risk shifting from banks to sovereign. This was not 
clear with CDS with 6-month maturity. 
Figure A.2.4 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 30-year maturity for the            
post-bailout period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013).  
Figure A.2.4: CDS spreads in the post-bailout period (30-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 30-year maturity, for the post-bailout 
period (31/10/2008-01/01/2013). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks 
CDS spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads 
of the six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without 
considering in the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. Source: author’s 
own evaluation.  
The lines representing sovereign CDS spreads and banks CDS spreads follow the same 
patterns. This supports the hypothesis that in the post-bailout period sovereign credit risk 
strongly affect banks credit risk.  
Moreover, we can identify a significant increase in the spreads in the period between 2011 
and 2012 when the crisis reached the most acute phase. 
Figure A.2.5 shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 30-year maturity for the 
Banking Union period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016).  
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Figure A.2.5: CDS spreads in the Banking Union period (30-year maturity) 
 
The figure shows the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS with 5-year maturity for the Banking Union 
period (01/01/2015-19/04/2016). The sovereign CDS spreads are represented by the blue line. The banks 
CDS spreads are represented by the red line and are computed as the simple average of the CDS spreads 
of the six major Italian banks. The green line represents the average bank CDS spreads without 
considering in the computation of the average Monte dei Paschi di Siena CDS spreads. 
Source: author’s own evaluation. 
From the figure we can notice that the spreads of sovereign and banks CDS start to diverge. 
This could indicate that the Banking Union breaks the link between sovereign and banks 
credit risks. 
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